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Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport
Dionne L. Koller*
Abstract
Across all levels of sport—professional, Olympic, intercollegiate,
interscholastic, and youth recreational—the prevailing view is that the
government should not take an active role in regulating athletics. As a result,
there are relatively few federal or state statutes directed at regulating sports,
and those that are aimed at sports primarily serve to support the professional
sports industry. Moreover, courts show great deference to sports leagues and
administrators, most often applying law in a way that insulates and empowers
them. This creates a climate where leagues and administrators are permitted
wide latitude to structure and conduct their respective sports as they see fit,
especially with regard to athlete regulation. With this environment in mind,
this Article examines what I define as the “legal and policy response to
concussions in sports,” which includes state statutes, proposed federal
legislation, “bully pulpit” initiatives such as a White House summit and
Congressional hearings, and substantial tort litigation. This Article explains
the ways that the legal and policy response to sports concussions is consistent
with the current sports law landscape and it highlights how the legal and policy
response to sports concussions charts the course for a new approach to law
and sports. In doing so, this Article makes two main points. First, the legal
and policy response to sports concussions provides a useful vehicle for
considering the underlying values that affect law and policy related to sports.
These values include minimal government involvement, playing despite injury,
and the view that aspects of sport are essential or fundamental. Second, the
legal and policy response to concussions in sports provides an important
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Sport and the Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law. This Article greatly benefitted from the valuable insights of the participants in the
Marquette University Law School’s Works-in-Progress conference as part of the National Sports Law
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Epstein, Nathaniel Grow, Gordon Hylton, Matthew Parlow, Meg Penrose, and Geoffrey Rapp. Thanks
as well to Kimberly Brown, Margaret Johnson, and Nancy Modesitt for their comments on earlier drafts.
I sincerely appreciate (and also greatly benefitted from) Bryce Ziskind and Elizabeth Burton’s assistance
with research.

681

[Vol. 43: 681, 2016]

Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

pathway for future sports regulation, particularly of youth and amateur sports
programs.
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, United States Senator John McCain appeared on the “Dan
Patrick Show” to talk sports.1 When asked by Patrick how much the
government should be involved in sports, Senator McCain answered: “[A]s
little as possible.”2 The only exception Senator McCain allowed for was in the
case of performance-enhancing drugs that Senator McCain believes provide a
unique situation for government involvement to ensure fairness and protect
children.3 Senator McCain’s views reflect the common wisdom about the
government and sports that less government involvement is the best approach.4
1. The Dan Patrick Show (NBC Sports Network television broadcast May 2, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBoroQZ6fEs.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 104th Cong. 90 (1995)
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Over the last several years, however, the public has shown greater interest
in using law to regulate sports.5 This interest has grown largely because of
media attention to professional and youth sports concussions.6 The concussion
issue landed on state and federal policy agendas in 2009 after the state of
Washington passed the first youth concussion-management statute.7 Shortly
thereafter, in 2012, numerous former professional football players and their
representatives brought claims against the National Football League (NFL) and
the makers of Riddell football helmets alleging that the NFL was aware of the
risk of concussions, negligently failed to protect players, and intentionally
concealed the dangers of concussions in football.8 Similarly, classes of former
players filed suit against the National Hockey League (NHL) and the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).9 More recently, a class action lawsuit
was filed against FIFA, the international governing body for soccer, and the
United States Soccer Federation, alleging that both entities knew of the dangers
of concussions but had not modified the game to protect players.10
To date, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes
addressing concussions in youth sports,11 and several bills have been introduced
in Congress to set uniform federal concussion-management standards, support
concussion research, and emphasize the role of schools in helping children with
[hereinafter Amateur Sports Act] (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair, President’s Council on
Physical Fitness and Sports) (stating that “Some argue that the government should have no role in
sports” and urging members of Congress to rethink “the attitude, the idea that laissez-faire is really the
right answer” when it comes to involvement in sports).
5. Improving Sports Safety: A Multifaceted Approach: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Congress 2 (2014)
[hereinafter Improving Sports Safety] (explaining the reason for the hearing as the “growing concern”
over the potential relationship between injuries suffered by professional athletes during their playing
days and the later development of neurological illnesses).
6. Id. (“There is no universal agreement on the definition of the term concussion, though it is
recognized as including some level of brain injury ranging from mild to traumatic.”).
7. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2009).
8. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 710 (E.D.
Pa. 2014).
9. See Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n StudentAthlete Concussion Injury Litig., No. 13-cv-09116, 2014 WL 7237208 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2015); In re
Nat’l Hockey League Player’s Concussion Injury Litig., No. MDL 14-2551 SRN, 2015 WL 1334027, at
*1 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2015).
10. Mehr v. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n, No. 14-cv-3879-PJH, 2015 WL 4366044, at *2
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) (granting FIFA’s motion to dismiss with prejudice for lack of personal
jurisdiction and dismissing plaintiff’s claims with leave to amend for failure to state a claim).
11. Indeed, nearly half of the states have amended their statutes at least once. See Hosea H. Harvey,
Dionne L. Koller & Kerri M. Lowrey, The Four Stages of Youth Sports TBI Policymaking: Engagement,
Enactment, Research, and Reform, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 87, 89 (2015).
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concussions “return to learn.”12 Moreover, United States President Obama
convened the White House Healthy Kids and Safe Sports Concussion Summit
to highlight the issue,13 and sports concussions also figured prominently in
efforts to unionize college athletes.14 The state statutes and proposed federal
legislation, significant tort litigation, and “bully pulpit”15 initiatives (such as the
White House summit) amount to what I define as the “legal and policy response
to sports concussions.”
This flurry of government activity related to sports, particularly in the
youth and amateur context, is noteworthy. Senator McCain’s comments are
representative of the prevailing view in the United States that the government—
courts, Congress, executive branch agencies, and state legislatures—should
defer to leagues and sports administrators to regulate themselves. As a result,
the legal and policy response to sports concussions provides a useful vehicle to
examine current attitudes toward government involvement in sports and to
consider how law might be used to shape sports in the future, particularly in the
youth and amateur contexts. To that end, this Article explores the legal and
policy response to concussions in youth, professional, and intercollegiate sports
by explaining how this response fits into the larger sports law landscape and
what the implications are for future regulation of sports.
Part II of this Article outlines the government’s relationship to sports in the
United States and explains how the legal and policy response to sports
concussions fits within the current sports law landscape. Part III explains the
details of the legal and policy response to concussions in sports and evaluates
its effectiveness. Part IV asserts that the legal and policy response to
concussions in sports has implications for sports law beyond the terms of
concussion statutes and litigation and explains how it contributes to a new

12. See Bryan Toporek, “Return-to-Learn” Protocol Concussed Student-Athletes Proposed in Va.,
Neb., EDUC. WK. (Jan. 17, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/schooled_in_sports/2014/
01/virginia_nebraska_youth-concussion_bills_would_institute_return-to-learn_protocol.html; see, e.g.,
National Traumatic Brain Injury Research and Treatment Improvement Act of 2014, H.R. 4251, 113th
Cong. (2014); Concussion Awareness and Education Act of 2014, H.R. 3954, 113th Cong. (2014);
Youth Sports Concussion Act, H.R. 2118, 113th Cong. (2013).
13. David Hudson, President Obama Hosts the Healthy Kids and Safe Sports Concussion Summit,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 29, 2014, 6:14 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/05/29/presidentobama-hosts-healthy-kids-and-safe-sports-concussion-summit.
14. Ivan Solotaroff, The Athlete Advocate, SBNATION (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/
longform/2014/4/23/5640402/the-athlete-advocate-ramogi-huma (explaining that the concussion issue
“galvanized” Ramogi Huma, who is leading the movement to unionize college athletes).
15. Douglas E. Abrams, Concussion Safety in Children’s Sports: A Central Role for the “Power of
the Permit”, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2015).
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framework for future regulation of sports, specifically in the youth and amateur
contexts.
II. BACKGROUND: THE GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONSHIP TO SPORTS
To properly contextualize the legal and policy response to sports
concussions and evaluate its implications for future sports regulation, it is first
important to provide an overview of the relationship between government and
sports in the United States, particularly at the youth and amateur sports levels.
Scholars have said that sport is “unique” in society in that “[n]o other
institution, except perhaps religion, commands the mystique, the nostalgia, the
romantic ideational cultural fixation that sport does.”16 This perhaps explains
the government’s uneasy relationship with sports—hoping to perpetuate the
magic by funding and supporting sports at various levels, but rarely seeking to
regulate it directly for fear of ruining the “mystique” that entertains us.17
To begin, there is, of course, much law that applies to sports.18 Matthew
Mitten and Hayden Opie state that “virtually all areas of law (individually and
in combination)” apply to sports competition.19 There is, however, relatively
little law specifically aimed at regulating sports, especially in the youth and
amateur contexts. Thus, general legal principles in areas such as contract and
tort law are applied in the sports context, as are statutes in areas such as
antitrust law and employment law.20 However, there is relatively little law
enacted to regulate sports.21 Yet the paucity of law directed at sports,
especially in the youth and amateur contexts, is remarkable given the
importance of sports in American culture,22 the relationship between sports
16. James H. Frey & D. Stanley Eitzen, Sport and Society, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 503, 503–04 (1991).
17. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the benefit derived
from the “magic” of college sports).
18. Sport in all contexts is subject to numerous laws and regulations, most notably in areas such as
constitutional law, antitrust law, contract law, tort law, disability law, labor law, and tax law. Indeed,
the term “sports law” includes a wide variety of diverse substantive areas of the law. Timothy Davis,
What Is Sports Law?, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 211, 215–16 (2001).
19. Matthew J. Mitten & Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of
International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269,
271 (2010).
20. Davis, supra note 18, at 211–13.
21. Id. at 211–13, 234–35 (stating that “[t]raditionally, private law was viewed as providing the
principal legal mechanism for regulating the sports industries . . . labor and antitrust law [that]
represented public law incursions into a realm deemed best governed and regulated by private
agreement”).
22. Richard P. Cole, Law, Sports, and Popular Culture: The Marriage of a Relationship Scorned, 23
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programs and educational institutions, the number of participants, and the
documented benefits of sports participation to overall health and well being.23
Nevertheless, the sentiment expressed by Senator McCain and reflected in
policy discussions—that the government should not be “involved” in sports—is
somewhat misleading. “Government involvement” in sports can mean different
things and come in different forms across a range of legal and policy contexts
at both the federal and state levels. Government involvement, therefore, can
include direct and indirect government funding, government affiliation through
sports teams embedded in public schools and universities,24 and direct
regulation through legislative and executive branch initiatives targeted at
sports. All of these types of government involvement are present to varying
degrees throughout American sports.25
Given the array of possible forms for government involvement in sports, it
is apparent that the values expressed by Senator McCain and incorporated into
the legal structure of sports is that some government involvement is, in fact,
welcomed by sports leagues and regulators and provides a backbone for
American sports to thrive. This includes government support of sports through
funding, such as stadium financing26 and the use of tax dollars to provide sports

W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (2002); Mary Jo Kane, Media Coverage of the Post Title IX Female Athlete:
A Feminist Analysis of Sport, Gender, and Power, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 95, 95 (1996)
(describing sport as “one of the most important institutions in American culture”); Andrew D.
Hohenstein, Comment, Team Physicians: Adhering to the Hippocratic Oath or Just Plain Hypocrites?,
19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 579, 579–80 (2009).
23. Robert J. Brustad, Runar Vilhjalmsson & Antonio Manuel Fonseca, Organized Sport and
Physical Activity Promotion, in YOUTH PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND SEDENTARY BEHAVIOR: CHALLENGES
AND SOLUTIONS 351 (Alan L. Smith & Stuart J.H. Biddle eds., 2008) (stating that “physical activity is
so strongly related to favorable physical, mental, and emotional health outcomes”); Rochelle M. Eime et
al., A Systematic Review of the Psychological and Social Benefits of Participation in Sport for Children
and Adolescents: Informing Development of a Conceptual Model of Health Through Sport, 10 INT’L J.
BEHAV. NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 1 (2013).
24. Indeed, the relationship between sports and schools is a source of American pride. See Mark A.
Emmert, Written Testimony of Dr. Mark A. Emmert President of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE COM., SCI., & TECH. (July 9, 2014), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/
90f902cf-ae2f-449b-ba8a-9da481c9bd50/FEB47F09BDAC6B2E01A129B8DAC21F24.emmert.pdf.
25. Indeed, critics have argued that “[o]ur government policies have helped develop and maintain an
elite sports structure of significant support for the Olympic Games, professional sports monopolies, tax
breaks for mega-stadiums, and anti-trust exemptions for pro teams. In contrast, our government is doing
next to nothing for the masses.” Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 90 (statement of Thomas
McMillen, Co-Chair, President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports).
26. MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND WHO’S
PAYING FOR IT 77, 88–122 (1999) (explaining how stadium financing and other aspects of the “sports
welfare system” ensure that “owners and players enjoy a gilded existence at the expense of taxpayers”).
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in public schools and universities.27 Indeed, the United States is unique28 in
having a substantial number of sports opportunities provided by educational
institutions. Also welcome is targeted government involvement that does not
seek to regulate the games themselves but instead promotes sport as an
industry, such as baseball’s antitrust exemption, gambling restrictions, and the
antitrust exemption permitting the creation of the NFL and pooling of broadcast
rights.29
In contrast, the kind of government involvement that is unwelcome by both
sports leagues and administrators, and most policymakers, is the type that
would use law to regulate the purpose, content, or management of sports
programs. Such regulation could include the purpose of sports in schools; the
way in which public high schools, colleges and universities structure, manage,
and pay for their sports programs and regulate their athletes; and even the rules
of play.
Thus, a more precise formulation of our current understanding with respect
to the government’s relationship to sports is that it is desirable for the
government to financially support and use law to privilege sports leagues and
regulators; however, law should not be used to directly regulate the content and
conduct of sports leagues and programs, especially as they manage athletes.
This formulation is reflected in the current structure of all levels of United
States sports, but most visibly in the youth and amateur context that some
characterize as the “Wild West.”30
A. A “Hands-Off” Approach
The notion that the government should stay out of sports31 to a large extent
27. For instance, Mark Emmert, President of the NCAA, testified before Congress about the
“collegiate model” for athletics and its importance in American culture, stating that “[t]his is a uniquely
American phenomenon. There is no model elsewhere in the world where athletics are tied so directly to
colleges and universities as an extension of the educational process.” Emmert, supra note 24, at 2–3.
28. Amanda Ripley, The Case Against High-School Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/the-case-against-high-school-sports/309447/
(stating that “[s]ports are embedded in American schools in a way they are not almost anywhere else”).
29. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (stating that courts have taken a “hands off”
approach to regulation); infra notes 114–22 and accompanying text (examples of government action
promoting sports).
30. Bruce Kelley & Carl Carchia, “Hey Data Data—Swing!”, ESPN (July 16, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9469252/hidden-demographics-youth-sports-espn-magazine.
31. See Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 88–89 (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair,
President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (describing the government’s “laissez-faire” attitude
towards sports).
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comes from the traditional view that sports are an individual, private pursuit32
and the idea that the games are different from commerce and, therefore, not
appropriate for government regulation.33 This has translated into a generous
degree of legal insulation for sports leagues, administrators, and regulators,
especially in the way that they manage athletes and structure the games. This
insulation is reflected in both the structure of sports, which is supported by
law,34 and sport litigation, particularly in cases where athletes seek legal relief
against sports regulators and administrators.35
The legal insulation of sports also characterizes debates about the existence
of “sports law” as an area of scholarly merit.36 For instance, in analyzing
whether “sports law” is an academic field, Professor Burlette Carter explained
that sports law has traditionally been “removed from the things that make a
field a field” because of the general lack of litigation establishing a specific
common law and the lack of “legislative and administrative action that creates a
statutory and regulatory [legal framework].”37 Professor Carter argued that
“this isolation has been no historical accident; it is deeply rooted in our
assumptions about the nature of sport, the nature of those who participate in it,
and our resulting treatment of both in the law.”38
The view that the government should stay out of sports, particularly at the
youth and amateur level, is prominently evidenced by the fact that most
organized sports opportunities for children are provided through the private
sector.39 Moreover, unlike most countries that participate in international
32. MARTIN BARRY VINOKUR, MORE THAN A GAME: SPORTS AND POLITICS 34 (1988) (stating that,
in “liberal capitalist society,” sport is considered “the concern of the individual”).
33. STEPHEN R. LOWE, THE KID ON THE SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 1910–
1992 19 (1995); see Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208–09 (1922) (noting that the fact that competitions induce free people to cross state lines is “a
mere incident” and “not a subject of commerce”).
34. See Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 88 (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair,
President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (stating that “what we have . . . is a situation where
Government has created one situation, an elite sports structure, and on the other by benign neglect has
created an America at the bottom where there are no resources, and I think it is an upside-down
system”).
35. See, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Introduction: What Makes a “Field” a “Field”, 1 VA. J. SPORTS &
L. 235, 240 (1999) (“Judicial decisions protecting entities involved in sport from lawsuit have further
limited sports lawyers’ practice opportunities.”).
36. See id. at 240–44 (suggesting “reasons why law schools should embrace the study of sports law
and encourage scholarship in the field”).
37. Id. at 244–45.
38. Id. at 245.
39. “Designing for Universal Access: How to Reach all Kids?” Roundtable Summary, ASPEN INST.
[hereinafter Designing], http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/PROJECT%
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sports, the United States does not have a “ministry for sports” or similar
government agency to promote and regulate youth and amateur athletics.40
Instead, youth and amateur sports participation is most often a function of
individual means and choices and private-sector goals.41 This fact makes it
difficult to determine how many children engage in competitive sports.42
Studies estimate that 21.5 million to 28.7 million children between the ages of
six and seventeen years old participate in private-sector competitive sports.43
Most organization at this level is achieved through non-profit groups such as
Little League, Pop Warner football, the Amateur Athletic Union, and countless
community leagues.44 One study found that such groups account for $5 billion
a year spent on youth sports.45
The structure of Olympic Movement sports in the United States is also
deliberately private.46 In an effort to better compete in international sports
against our Cold War enemies, United States President Ford established a
Commission on Olympic Sports that recommended legal reforms to encourage
“individual athletic achievement” and Olympic success through the free market
and not federal regulation (in contrast with our Communist opponents).47
Congress responded by establishing the modern United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) through what is now known as the Ted Stevens Olympic
and Amateur Sports Act (the Act).48
Congress created the USOC as a federally chartered, non-profit patriotic
corporation49 and not a federal agency. The purposes of the USOC include,
among other things, coordinating and developing amateur athletic activities
related to international amateur-athletic competition and obtaining the best
20PLAY%20Roundtable%20Summary--Universal%20Access.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2016); see
David K. Wiggins, A Worthwhile Effort? History of Organized Youth Sport in the United States, 2
KINESIOLOGY REV. 1, 65 (2013).
40. Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application to Amateur Sports,
82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 196 (2008).
41. Designing, supra note 39.
42. See Kelley & Carchia, supra note 30 (stating that “no one agency or organization monitors youth
sports either as a central part of American childhood or as an industry”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Constitutional Rights
in the Pursuit of National Prestige, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1465, 1478 (2008).
47. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON OLYMPIC SPORTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION
ON OLYMPIC SPORTS 1975–1977 1 (1977).
48. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–29 (2012).
49. Id. § 220507.
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amateur United States athletes for participation in the Olympic Games.50 To do
this, the Act provided that the USOC would recognize privately incorporated
National Governing Bodies (NGBs) for each Olympic Movement sport.51
Congress, through the Act, also granted the USOC the exclusive right to use the
Olympic trademarks, which carry substantial economic benefit, to ensure the
USOC could adequately fund its activities without government support.52 The
Act, therefore, codified the private nature of Olympic Movement sports by not
giving the government a role in selecting or training athletes for international
competition.53 Moreover, it took the government out of the role of promoting
grass roots youth sports participation by making such activities part of the
USOC’s mission.54
The Act also envisioned limited future government involvement in the
Olympic Movement by circumscribing the role for courts. The statute does not
include a private right of action for athletes55 and mandates that disputes be sent
to binding arbitration.56 Congress amended the Act in 1998 to deny courts
jurisdiction to grant an injunction allowing an athlete to compete in the
Olympic Games within twenty-one days of the start of the Games.57 Moreover,
the Supreme Court held that the USOC is not a state actor.58 All of this reflects
the view stated by Judge Posner in Michels v. United States Olympic Committee
that “there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for
determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the eligibility, of
athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.”59 Indeed, courts have only

50. Id. § 220503.
51. Id. § 220505(c)(4).
52. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 522 (1987).
53. The Act gives the USOC “exclusive jurisdiction” and authority over the participation and
selection of athletes for Olympic Movement competition. See id.
54. TOM FARREY, GAME ON: HOW THE PRESSURE TO WIN AT ALL COSTS ENDANGERS YOUTH
SPORTS, AND WHAT PARENTS CAN DO ABOUT IT 184–90 (2009).
55. Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 157–58 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the
legislative history of the Amateur Sports Act clearly shows that Congress did not intend to create a
private right of action for athletes because the proposal to do so was “met with strong resistance by the
high school and college communities”); see also Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580,
588 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the “Act did not provide for a private right of action under which
[Plaintiff] could seek to have those claims addressed by the district court”); DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (D.D.C. 1980) (concluding that it could not “find that plaintiffs [had]
an implied private right of action under the Mateur Sports Act to enforce a right which [did] not exist”).
56. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(4).
57. Id. § 220509.
58. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 527.
59. Michels, 741 F.2d at 159.
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recognized a cause of action for athletes who allege that the USOC or an NGB
has not followed its own rules.60
Similarly, the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), the entity that
provides drug testing and results management for United States Olympic
Movement sports, also is structured as a private, not-for-profit corporation61
and not a government agency. Unlike the USOC, USADA was not created by
statute.62 However, Congress “designated” USADA as the official anti-doping
agency of the United States Olympic Movement63 and required the USADA to
“ensure that athletes participating in amateur athletic activities recognized by
the United States Olympic Committee are prevented from using performanceenhancing drugs or prohibited performance-enhancing methods adopted by the
[USADA].”64 Athlete disputes with the USADA are sent to binding
arbitration,65 and as with the USOC, courts have reinforced the “private” nature
of the USADA by finding that it is not a state actor subject to constitutional
restraints.66
Intercollegiate and interscholastic sports programs also enjoy considerable
insulation from government regulation, despite the fact that nearly all of them,
whether in public or private schools, are recipients of government funding.67
Thus, courts,68 Congress, and state legislatures give great deference to

60. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000); Foschi v. U.S. Swimming,
Inc., 916 F. Supp. 232, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 1476,
1480 (D. Or. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995).
61. Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA Takes Over
Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 127
(2003).
62. Id. at 124–25.
63. 21 U.S.C.A. § 2001(b) (West 2014).
64. Id. § 2001(b)(2).
65. U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING
13 (2014).
66. Armstrong v. Tygart, 886 F. Supp. 2d 572, 581 n.18 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (“[T]he Court assumes
the relevant entities are government actors . . . . The Court notes, however, it is very possible neither
USADA nor USA Cycling qualify as government actors for constitutional purposes.” (first citing S.F.
Arts & Athletics, Inc., v, U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546 (1987); and then citing Behagen v.
Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 884 F.2d 524, 531 (10th Cir. 1989))).
67. See Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments
Take Subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/
2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/; Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances, USA TODAY,
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2015) (listing government subsidies to
230 schools).
68. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 907 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that universities should be able
to “pursue their missions free from governmental interference”).
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institutions to establish and administer their programs with little legal
interference,69 which allows voluntary associations, such as the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the National Federation of State
High School Associations (NFSHSA), to take primary responsibility in setting
the agenda for the way education-based sports programs will be structured.70
Such a view has early roots. United States President Theodore Roosevelt
responded to the crisis of violence and deaths in college football by calling a
White House summit to urge colleges and universities to regulate themselves
and make the game safer.71 This began a period of what commentators call
“tremendous judicial deference and goodwill” that the NCAA enjoys in
regulating intercollegiate athletics.72 Professor Gary Roberts made the point
clear to Congress in a hearing regarding the NCAA and the way in which it
enforces its rules, stating “the NCAA’s enforcement process and procedures are
unconstrained by either federal constitutional or state law.”73
The federal government has continued its deferential posture toward the
NCAA, even in the face of persistent concerns over fairness to student-athletes.
For instance, in 2004, Congress held hearings on “Due Process and the NCAA”
and, in doing so, emphasized that the NCAA should be left to establish and
enforce its own rules.74 Representative Tom Osborne, a former University of
Nebraska football coach, stated the prevailing sentiment that Congress should
not regulate college sports:

69. MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & N. JEREMI DURU, SPORTS LAW
REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 27 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing courts’ deference
to schools and athletic associations to regulate interscholastic and intercollegiate sports); Diane
Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic Athletics, 5 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 (2005).
70. See Heckman, supra note 69, at 6–10.
71. LOWE, supra note 33, at 5 (explaining that the summit did not reach any “definite conclusions”
but that the president gave “the ball of reform a push”); Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver
Malagrino, Hold Your Fire: The Injustice of NCAA Sanctions on Innocent Student Athletes, 11 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 432, 439 n.21 (2012).
72. W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 69
(2000).
73. Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 27 (2004) (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy Dean & Director, Sports
Law Program, Tulane Law School).
74. Id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the Constitution) (“Let me
state at the outset what this hearing is not about. It is not about the wisdom of any particular NCAA
substantive rule. Nor is it about the NCAA’s authority to enforce its rules. The NCAA provides a
valuable function in policing collegiate athletics, and we are not here to relitigate any particular decision
that the NCAA has made.”).
AND
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A common misconception is that the NCAA is a separate authority
that governs college athletics. However, the NCAA is a voluntary
organization composed of member institutions that are involved in its
self-governance. It is certainly appropriate for Congress to conduct
hearings to gain a better understanding of the NCAA. However, I
believe that the NCAA is best situated to understand its governance
needs.75
More recently, in hearings on the “legal issues relating to football head
injuries,” several members of Congress stated that the government could help
to encourage discussion of the issues but should not regulate them.76 One
congressman stated that “[w]e should also avoid the temptation to legislate in
this area . . . . We cannot legislate the elimination of injuries from the games
without eliminating the games themselves.”77 Similarly, in the same hearing,
Congressman Bob Goodlatte stated that “while we do want to pay close
attention to what is going on here,” Congress should not “engage in legislation
that would allow or prohibit certain types of plays from taking place in high
school or college or major league athletics.”78 He went on to state that
Congress “should not take up that kind of micromanagement of American
athletics.”79 Chairman Conyers replied that, “[o]f course, we would never do
anything like that.”80 Similarly, in recent hearings on college sports and the
well being of college athletes, Senator John Thune made clear that Congress
should defer to the NCAA and its member institutions, stating that:
[I]t is my hope that the NCAA, its member institutions . . . and other
stakeholders will seek solutions . . . and seek to preserve amateurism in
collegiate athletics. This is an area where Congress can provide a
forum—but the solutions are most likely to come from those most
directly involved in the education and development of student-

75. Id. at 110 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne, Member, H. Subcomm. on the Constitution).
76. See id.; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
77. Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Part I & II): Hearings Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of Rep. Lamer Smith, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (“Congress can highlight the potential long-term consequences of playing professional
football through hearings like this one, but the NFL does not need Congress to referee this issue.”).
78. Id. at 19 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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athletes.81
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) also has taken a deferential
stance toward the NCAA. In 2015, the NLRB decided an appeal from a
Regional Director’s decision that Northwestern University’s scholarship
football players are “employees” within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act.82 The NLRB decided that “even if the scholarship players were
statutory employees . . . we have concluded that it will not effectuate the
policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.”83 The NLRB relied on the
unique nature of league sports and the NCAA’s oversight of college sports, as
well as the fact that the NCAA had undertaken reforms to address the needs of
scholarship football players, in concluding that asserting jurisdiction “would
not promote stability in labor relations.”84
Although it certainly has taken an “interest” in the area, Congress also has
shown deference to professional sports leagues.85 This deference is especially
evident in the case of baseball.86 One commentator has explained that
Congress’s attitude toward professional sports leagues can be explained as a
function of the public’s perception of the particular sport.87 While Congress’s
“legislative inactivity concerning professional sports . . . is typical in the life of
the national legislature,”88 it is still noteworthy because it is evident that such
inactivity can be linked, at least somewhat, to a belief that government should
not take a role in regulating sports. Moreover, deference shown by Congress to
sports leagues is shared across other levels and branches of government.
Like Congress, courts also take a “hands off” approach to regulating sports
by using law to insulate the decisions of sports regulators. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that the NCAA is not a state actor and is therefore not
subject to constitutional constraints.89 In cases involving high school and

81. Thune Statement on NCAA Sports and Success of College Athletes Hearing, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE COM., SCI., & TRANSP. (June 9, 2014), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
/2014/7/thune-statement-on-ncaa-sports-and-success-of-college-athletes-hearing.
82. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n v. NLRB, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 1 (Aug. 17, 2015).
83. Id. at 3, 7.
84. Id. at 3.
85. LOWE, supra note 33, at 5.
86. Id. at 80, 131 (explaining that, “[i]n short, many members of Congress have felt that organized
baseball deserved a status above the law” and that “baseball’s image as the patriotic, pastoral and
innocent national pastime paralyzed legislative attempts to place it under the antitrust laws”).
87. Id. at 131–32.
88. Id. at 27.
89. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 179 (1988).
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college athletes, courts have held that participation in athletics is a “privilege”
and not a right.90 Courts also take the position that they are not in the best
position to decide sports disputes over issues such as an athlete’s eligibility and
should instead defer to sports regulators and voluntary associations to make
decisions according to their own rules.91 Courts will only step in to ensure that
regulators are following their established procedures.92
Similarly, in cases involving athletes who seek to participate in sports
despite an enhanced risk of harm because of a physical disability, courts have
deferred to the institution to determine eligibility. For instance, in Knapp v.
Northwestern University, a basketball player brought a claim under the
Rehabilitation Act challenging Northwestern’s decision that the athlete was not
eligible to play because of a potentially fatal cardiac defect.93 Although the
athlete and his parents were willing to assume the risk of harm, the court stated
that “medical determinations of this sort are best left to team doctors and
universities as long as they are made with reason and rationality and with full
regard to possible and reasonable accommodations” and that “the university has
the right to determine that an individual is not otherwise medically qualified to
play.”94
Courts also are careful in applying tort law to conduct that occurs during
sports. Scholars have explained that generally “sports participants are . . .
immune . . . from ordinary negligence actions” because robust play makes it
impossible to exercise reasonable care.95 Voluntary participants in athletic

90. See Sisson v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., No. 7:10-cv-00530, 2010 WL 5173264, at *3 (W.D.
Va. Dec. 14, 2010) (citing cases stating that the “privilege” of participating in interscholastic athletics is
not protected by the due process clause); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88,
110 n.10 (W.D. Va. 2007) (citing cases holding that the privilege of participating in interscholastic
athletics is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
91. See generally Crane by Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1319–20 (7th Cir.
1992); Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004); Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
Inc. v. Carlberg by Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. 1997); Hispanic Coll. Fund, Inc. v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 826 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001).
92. See Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA’s No Agent Rule Called out, but Remains Safe,
17 SPORTS L.J. 303, 306 (2010) (explaining that “courts generally give great deference to voluntary
associations” and that “courts are reluctant to tell the NCAA what to do”).
93. 101 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 1996).
94. Id.
95. MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 988 (2d ed. 2007); see also
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir. 1979) (adopting a recklessness standard).
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activities are said to assume the usual, inherent risks of participation.96 The
exception is where a participant is injured by intentional or deliberate conduct
outside the scope of the game.97 Notably, courts recognize that conduct that
intentionally violates the rules of a given sport may also be part of the game,
and they consider a player injured by such conduct to have assumed the risk.98
This standard extends to coaches and institutions, such as leagues and school
districts, that sponsor athletic activity.99
Finally, deference to sports regulators is even evident in previous efforts to
use tort law to provide a remedy to athletes harmed by sports concussions.100
For instance, in the professional context, athletes have faced numerous barriers
to recovery.101 Similarly, in Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Public School,
a high school football player brought a claim alleging that he suffered a head
injury because his coaches were negligent in allowing him to return to play.102
The court held that the coaches’ conduct was reasonable for football coaches.103
In another case, a high school student’s claim against a state public high school
athletic association was dismissed because the court found the student could not
show that the organization’s failure to implement rules for concussions was the
cause of his injury.104 The school districts and individual schools were
responsible for such rules.105
The limited amount of government involvement in sports, as well as the
deliberate insulation of sports from government interference, provides powerful
space for sports regulators to structure their programs, manage athletes, and
enforce sports rules and norms through tools such as collective bargaining
agreements, bylaws, and contracts that set the terms and conditions for

96. COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 95, at 988.
97. Id.
98. See Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 394 (Cal. 2006) (explaining that, “[f]or
better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of
baseball”); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Mass. 1989) (“The problem of imposing a duty of care
on participants in a sports competition is a difficult one. . . . The courts are wary of imposing wide tort
liability on sports participants, lest the law chill the vigor of athletic competition.”).
99. See Avila, 131 P.3d at 387.
100. Timothy Davis, Tort Liability of Coaches for Injuries to Professional Athletes: Overcoming
Policy and Doctrinal Barriers, 76 UMKC L. REV. 571, 592 (2008).
101. Id.; see, e.g., Atkins v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 694 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir.
2012); Smith v. Hous. Oiler, Inc., 87 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996).
102. 679 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Neb. 2004).
103. Id.
104. Serrell v. Connetquot Cent. High Sch. Dist., 721 N.Y.S.2d 107, 107 (App. Div. 2001).
105. Id.
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participation. Sports administrators and regulators advance several reasons for
why they must be insulated from government regulation. First, with respect to
sports programs in schools, there is an argument that courts and legislatures
should not interfere with the “educational process.”106 The second rationale for
limiting the state’s role in regulating sports is that regulation will make sports
administration too costly, thereby limiting participation opportunities.107 For
instance, the court in Nabozny v. Barnhill stated that “the law” should not
“place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by
our youth.”108 It is also suggested that greater legal regulation will make sports
as currently constructed (and publicly beloved) impossible to administer.109
Finally, the NCAA frequently invokes patriotic values with respect to
intercollegiate sports, stating that the “collegiate model” that uses sports as an
extension of the educational process “is a uniquely American phenomenon”
and that “[s]ome countries . . . desire to emulate our model.”110 The NCAA
also stresses that “a valuable untold story” is that the model for sports in

106. Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1976) (“The educational process is a broad and
comprehensive concept . . . . It is not limited to classroom attendance but includes innumerable separate
components, such as participation in athletic activity.”); Carter, supra note 72, at 69–70 (discussing
reasons why courts traditionally have deferred to the NCAA).
107. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 304 (2001)
(addressing the high school athletic association’s argument that holding the entity to be a state actor
would “trigger an epidemic of unprecedented federal litigation”); Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d
1, 42 (Mich. 2010) (stating that holding parental pre-injury waivers unenforceable will increase sportsrelated litigation and cause youth sports opportunities to “dwindle out of a reasonable fear of tort
liability” and that youth sports providers will be subject to increased liability and insurance costs which
will lead to a reduction in sports opportunities or increased participation costs).
108. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
109. See Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing Student
Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of
Kenneth W. Starr, President and Chancellor, Baylor University) (responding to decision by Regional
Director of the NLRB allowing Northwestern University football players to form a labor union, stating
that allowing such an outcome would lead to “unfortunate outcomes, including programmatic cutbacks
or escalating tuition—at a time when many institutions of higher learning are struggling to keep costs
low and thereby maintain college affordability”); IHSA Responds to Concussion Lawsuit, ILL. HIGH
SCH. ASS’N (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.ihsa.org/NewsMedia/Announcements/tabid/93/ID/558/IHSAResponds-To-Concussion-Lawsuit.aspx (stating that “potential repercussions” of a concussion lawsuit
would “threaten the future of all high school sports for the millions of students around the country who
annually benefit from their participation experiences”); Transcript of Comments from U.S. Senators
Richard Burr, Lamar Alexander, NCAA (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/transcript-comments-us-senators-richard-burr-lamar-alexander (responding to NLRB
Regional Director’s decision on Northwestern football players’ unionization petition and arguing that
allowing college athletes to unionize, combined with Title IX, “may result in further reductions of
athletic programs and opportunities on college campuses”).
110. Emmert, supra note 24, at 2–3.
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colleges and universities “helped shape many leaders and great citizens of
America” and that it is a model that “has served this country.”111 In all, across
a range of contexts, it is evident that the prevailing norm is for the government
to limit its involvement in sports.
B. Using Law to Promote Sports and Reaffirm the Power of Sports Regulators
There are, of course, areas that might appear to be exceptions to the
government’s hands-off approach to sports regulation where statutes are
specifically directed to regulating sports or where law is applied by courts to
regulators’ actions. However, this use of law usually is aimed at promoting and
facilitating the growth of sports leagues and programs and is generally
welcomed by sports regulators.112 Moreover, courts applying law in areas such
as civil rights and antitrust generally reaffirm the role of sports regulators as the
primary and best authority to determine who is eligible to play and under what
conditions.113
There are several early examples of statutory and common law being used
to promote or privilege the professional sports industry. There is baseball’s
legendary antitrust exemption114 and, more recently, the Curt Flood Act.115
Similarly, federal statutes allowing for the pooling of broadcasting rights and
the merger of the NFL and American Football League116 are aimed at
111. Id. at 6.
112. See LOWE, supra note 33, at 81 (explaining that regulation can give a sport a place of “legitimacy
and importance” in American life); ROSENTRAUB, supra note 26, at 73, 87 (stating that “owners, not
consumers, with the help of court decisions and the U.S. Congress, have established cartels” for the four
major sports leagues and that “legislation to create a free and open market for professional sports has
never been passed by Congress; in fact, when Congress has acted, it has been to extend protections to
the sports leagues”); Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 90 (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair,
President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (stating that “our government policies have helped
develop and maintain an elite sports structure of significant support for the Olympic Games, professional
sports monopolies, tax breaks for mega-stadiums, and antitrust exemptions for pro teams”).
113. See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 26.
114. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 200
(1922) (holding that baseball games are not interstate commerce and therefore are not subject to the
antitrust laws); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding that baseball is interstate
commerce but an antitrust exemption stands as a matter of stare decisis for which Congress, not the
courts, is the remedy); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (holding that baseball is
exempt from antitrust laws). The stage was set for this “jurisdictional volleyball” over baseball’s
monopolistic practices in the 1951 baseball hearings before Congress where Congress chose not to take
action on issues such as the reserve clause, preferring instead to defer to courts. LOWE, supra note 33, at
17–24.
115. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012).
116. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
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facilitating the growth and protecting the integrity of professional sports, as are
statutes that prohibit sports bribery117 and gambling118 and regulate boxing.119
Congress and individual states have enacted laws to aid NCAA member
institutions through the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
(SPARTA)120 and the Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA).121 Additionally,
state statutes aimed at discrete areas or specific sports—such as statutes
regulating sports agents, boxing, and mixed martial arts or statutes providing
stadium financing—all work towards supporting the professional sports
industry.122
Likewise, as discussed above, Congress also has regulated Olympic
Movement sports through the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act
and appropriations for, and recognition of, the USADA. These initiatives are
meant to reinforce the private status of the USOC and USADA and enable them
to flourish as independent corporations that do not owe athletes constitutional
protections.123 It also allows the USOC to set priorities for amateur sports in
the United States—such as winning Olympic medals over broad-based,
grassroots sports participation—largely unhampered by other public policy
goals.124 Moreover, in both cases, law was used to insulate the USOC and the
USADA as much as possible from court intervention, at least with respect to
managing athletes.125
The fight against doping in sports, however, seemingly provides a type of
“national interest” exception to the usual “hands off” approach the government
takes with sports.126 Yet even this “exception” of sorts is limited.127 The

117. Sports Bribery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2012).
118. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).
119. Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301–13 (2012).
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–07 (2012).
121. Critics have explained that the effect of both the UAAA and SPARTA is to provide a cause of
action to NCAA member institutions against athlete agents who make contact with players in a way that
jeopardizes their amateur status and NCAA eligibility. Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of
the UAAA and SPARTA: How America Should Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True
Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 169 (2013).
122. See, e.g., Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2000)
(California law regulating sports agents); Phillip J. Closius, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Fan Scorned:
State Regulation of Sports Agents, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 514–15 (1999).
123. Dionne L. Koller, From Medals to Morality: Sportive Nationalism and the Problem of Doping in
Sports, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 91, 91, 118 (2008); see DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F.
Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980).
124. Koller, supra note 123, at 101.
125. See supra notes 36–40, 55–60 and accompanying text.
126. See Koller, supra note 123, at 112–17.
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intervention in this area does not include a government agency or formal legal
regulation through statutes or court decisions.128 Instead, it exists in a “legal
twilight zone,” where the federal government has used its influence over the
United States Olympic Movement to shape private outcomes.129 Thus,
although USADA was established as a private corporation, both Congress and
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) had a significant role in
creating it by influencing the USOC.130 In doing so, ONDCP expressed the
concern that while the new entity needed important status in the United States
Olympic Movement: “[W]e have to be very respectful of the notion of amateur
sports and the independence of amateur sports from Federal intervention.”131
The federal government’s influence was used again prior to the 2004 Athens
Olympic Games when a Senate Committee subpoenaed documents from the
Department of Justice that were part of the infamous Bay Area Laboratory
Cooperative investigation.132 The Committee turned the documents over to
USADA so that USADA could prevent certain athletes from competing in the
upcoming Olympic Games.133 USADA continues to partner with federal agents
to target athletes involved with performance-enhancing drugs,134 and the
government has sought to use criminal law to punish athletes for issues related
to performance-enhancing drug use.135
The anti-doping exception to the government’s usual deferential approach
to sports leagues and regulators also is limited because of the scope of the
athletes covered by such an intervention.136 Indeed, despite having the

127. Id. at 117–23.
128. Koller, supra note 40, at 184.
129. Id.
130. Koller, supra note 46, at 1465, 1493 (explaining that both ONDCP and Congress had “direct
influence over how USADA would be structured and what its mission would be”); see Drugs in Sports:
Compromising the Health of Athletes and Undermining the Integrity of Competition: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
110th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Jim Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Olympic Comm.)
(explaining that the Committee had a role in creating the USADA).
131. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic Competition:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 106th Cong. 20 (1999) (statement of Gen.
Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the
President).
132. Koller, supra note 40, at 183, 215.
133. Id. at 214.
134. Id. at 215.
135. Those athletes include Marion Jones, Roger Clemens, Barry Bonds, and Lance Armstrong.
136. Michael Straubel, The International Convention Against Doping in Sport: Is It the Missing Link
to USADA Being a State Actor and WADC Coverage of U.S. Pro Athletes?, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
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authority, Congress has refused to mandate that American professional sports
and other sports leagues outside of the Olympic Movement submit to testing by
USADA.137 This was made clear when the Senate ratified the International
Convention Against Doping in Sport (ICADIS) in 2008.138 In doing so, the
Senate limited the definition of an athlete for doping control purposes to
“particularly exclude from ICADIS’s coverage U.S. professional athletes,
and . . . college and high school athletes.”139
There is also an apparent exception to the government’s usual “hands off”
approach to sports for statutes that are aimed at sports health and safety. These
statutes are directed primarily at professional, not youth or amateur, sports.
The most significant of these types of initiatives are statutes regulating boxing
and mixed martial arts.140 In addition, federal regulation of performanceenhancing drugs, particularly steroids, is often justified as necessary to promote
athletes’ health and safety.141 However, while health and safety is certainly a
feature of these statutes, it is apparent that they also serve to support regulated
sports by making them safer and enhancing their commercial legitimacy.142
Moreover, anti-doping measures also are crucial for legitimizing the United
States’ participation in international sports143 and preserving the commercial
viability of professional sports as a forum for “fair” competition.144
As with professional and Olympic Movement sports, what little
government action there is directed to youth and amateur sports is meant to
encourage participation in such programs and not influence the content. For
63, 63–64 (2008).
137. Id.
138. ICADIS was intended to “throw the sovereign power of nation-states behind the fight against
performance enhancing drugs in sport” by requiring nations “to adopt measures that will give force to
the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) and support the work of the World Anti-Doping
Agency (WADA).” Id. at 64.
139. Id. at 75–76 (explaining that limiting the coverage of ICADIS was a “political necessity” in the
United States because the professional leagues “do not want to be governed by the terms of the World
Anti-Doping Code, nor turn over testing to an entity entirely outside of their control,” so the Senate
defined the athletes subject to the Code as those competing in Olympic Movement sports).
140. Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301–13 (2012).
141. Office of National Drug Control Policy Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 2001–03 (2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
49030 (West 2007) (banning certain substances from being used by students participating in high school
sports); R.I. GEN. LAWS §16-21.4-2 (2015) (banning promotion of dietary supplements to students).
142. See LOWE, supra note 33, at 81 (discussing the “legitimacy” that boxing would gain if it was
federally regulated).
143. Koller, supra note 123, at 112–17. In addition, nations who hope to host the Olympic Games are
now required to adopt the ICADIS and the World Anti-Doping Code and support the work of the World
Anti-Doping Agency. Straubel, supra note 136, at 63–64.
144. See Straubel, supra note 136, at 87.
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instance, United States President Dwight Eisenhower created the President’s
Council on Youth Fitness in 1953 in response to reports on the poor state of
youth physical fitness in the United States.145 The goal was for the Council to
be a “catalytic agent” focused on creating public awareness of the benefits of
youth physical fitness.146
United States President Lyndon Johnson
subsequently changed the name to the President’s Council on Physical Fitness
and Sports to encourage greater youth fitness through participation in sports.147
The Nixon administration established the Presidential Sports Award to motivate
participation in physical activity.148 Subsequent administrations have continued
to promote awareness and involvement in youth sports to enhance physical
fitness,149 and in 2002 United States President George W. Bush issued an
Executive Order directing the Department of Health and Human Services to
“develop and coordinate” a national program to stimulate sports participation
and physical fitness as well as good nutrition.150 The goals of the President’s
Council have been to promote awareness and generate interest in sports
participation.151 The Council does not seek to use law to create a sports
structure that would promote greater participation or otherwise shape sports
participation opportunities that are currently being provided.152
145. Our History, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON FITNESS, SPORTS & NUTRITION, http://www.fitness.gov/
about-pcfsn/our-history/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. President Bush’s original program was limited to sports participation and physical fitness. Exec.
Order No. 13,265, 67 Fed. Reg. 39,841 (June 6, 2002). A revised order, signed by President Barack
Obama, expanded the program to include nutrition and stated that HHS should seek to:
(a) [E]xpand national interest in and awareness of the benefits of regular physical activity,
fitness, sports participation, and good nutrition; (b) stimulate and enhance coordination of
programs within and among the private and public sectors that promote physical activity,
fitness, sports participation, and good nutrition; (c) expand availability of quality information
and guidance regarding physical activity, fitness, sports participation, and good nutrition; and
(d) target all Americans, with particular emphasis on children and adolescents, as well as
populations or communities in which specific risks or disparities in participation in, access to,
or knowledge about the benefits of physical activity, fitness, sports participation, and good
nutrition have been identified.
Exec. Order No. 13,545, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,283 (June 22, 2010).
151. See Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 90 (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair,
President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (stating that the President’s Council is the “sole
federal agency devoted to physical fitness and sports”).
152. See FARREY, supra note 54, at 75–76 (describing the President’s Council on Physical Fitness as a
“barely funded, strictly advisory committee that works with the Department of Health and Human
Services to recommend programs to encourage sports participation”).

702

[Vol. 43: 681, 2016]

Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Additionally, the government has supported youth sports through initiatives
that include Congress incorporating Little League baseball153 and granting
liability protections for volunteers who serve in nonprofit and other
associations, such as youth sports organizations.154 Moreover, there are state
statutes in a handful of areas that address issues related to youth and amateur
sports, such as encouraging youth sports providers to obtain criminal
background checks on coaches,155 establishing athletic codes of conduct to
regulate behavior of observers at youth sporting events,156 limiting liability for
youth sports program volunteers,157 and allowing certain minors to officiate
youth sports activities.158 Notably, state law initiatives aimed at regulating the
NCAA were struck down for being in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.159 None of the regulations that do exist, however, serve to shape what
sports will be offered or the way youth and amateur sports are played.
Case law also evidences a deferential posture toward professional leagues
and youth and amateur sports.160 In most cases, litigation has served to reaffirm
and insulate the authority of private regulators—not courts or legislators—to
structure and manage sports.161 For instance, with the exception of Major
League Baseball, antitrust law potentially has important application to
professional and intercollegiate sports. While courts have held that antitrust
153. 36 U.S.C. § 130502 (2012) (explaining that Little League’s purposes are promoting the game of
baseball, “developing qualities of citizenship and sportsmanship,” and using baseball to “teach spirit and
competitive will to win, physical fitness through individual sacrifice, the values of team play, and
wholesome well being”).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 14501 (2012) (explaining that volunteers are withdrawing from community
organizations because of fear of liability).
155. OR. REV. STAT. § 418.696 (2013) (encouraging “youth sports provider[s]” to “adopt a list of
crimes that disqualify” an individual from coaching, complete criminal background checks, and
“complete a sports education program”).
156. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-319.2 (West 2015) (requiring physical examination to
participate in extracurricular sports); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-436 (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring
schools to implement programs that provide awareness of sudden cardiac arrest); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 5:17-2 (West 2015) (granting power to the school board to ban any student, coach, parent or game
official who violates athletic code of conduct) .
157. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85V (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-48 (2014).
158. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205 / 2.5 (2014).
159. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993); Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Roberts, No. TCA 94-40413-WS, 1994 WL 750585, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov.
8, 1994).
160. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 (1984)
(“[A]s the guardian of an important American tradition, the NCAA’s motives must be accorded a
respectful presumption of validity . . . .”).
161. See supra Part II.A.
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principles apply to challenged restraints,162 courts also grant leagues and
regulators deference because of what courts find is the unique nature of the
product—competition itself.163 Courts therefore use a “Rule of Reason
analysis” in all cases, even those where a per se analysis would apply.164 As the
Supreme Court has stated: “[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all.”165 The Court also recognized that the need to
maintain competitive balance amongst teams in a league is an important feature
of sports because it insulates agreements from antitrust liability.166
In cases involving the NCAA’s commercial dealings, and not player
regulation, courts have generally taken an approach that is “unremarkable and
consistent with more traditional antitrust methodology.”167 The Supreme Court
applied antitrust law to the NCAA in 1984 when it held in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma that the NCAA’s restraint on the
number of college football games that its members could broadcast violated the
Sherman Act.168 However, the Court also suggested what would become a
“dichotomous”169 approach to regulating the NCAA through antitrust litigation
by reaffirming the NCAA’s “critical” role in preserving the “revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports.”170 The Court stated that it was beyond
question that the NCAA “needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and
diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”171 Consistent with this reasoning, in cases
challenging NCAA rules affecting players, such as recruiting and eligibility,
courts have given the NCAA “special treatment.”172 Professor Gabe Feldman
has explained how the Supreme Court essentially granted the NCAA an

162. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202–03 (2010).
163. Gabe Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249, 252
n.22 (2014).
164. Id. at 249 n.2, 251.
165. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
166. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 204.
167. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 340 (2007).
168. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88.
169. Lazaroff, supra note 167, at 340–41.
170. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
171. Id.
172. Feldman, supra note 163, at 250 (explaining the “muddled, incoherent deference to the NCAA”
under the Sherman Act and the “special treatment” that the NCAA receives due to the “myth of
amateurism”).
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antitrust defense in player restraint cases based on “amateurism and academic
ideals”173 despite the fact that these principles have “no place in the equation
and . . . no impact on the legality of a restraint.”174 Thus, since Board of
Regents, courts for varying reasons largely have declined to hold that NCAA
player restraints violate antitrust law, affording the NCAA “anomalous antitrust
deference.”175
Courts also have applied federal civil rights statutes and constitutional law
to sports, which some commentators state “play an increasingly important role
in governing legal relationships in sports.”176 Although not directly aimed at
sports, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, Title VI,
and constitutional law principles—such as the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments—all have been applied in the sports context.177 However, in
nearly all of these cases, courts have held that sports regulators should be left to
determine the structure of their sports programs. For instance, in Bloom v.
NCAA, the court found that Bloom, a student-athlete, had standing to challenge
the NCAA’s application of amateurism rules that prevented him from
competing as a professional skier while also playing football for the University
of Colorado.178 However, the court ultimately held that the NCAA’s rules in
this regard and their application specifically to Bloom were reasonable, and it
declined to issue an injunction that would have allowed Bloom to ski
competitively and play NCAA football.179
Likewise, in Knapp v. Northwestern University, discussed above, while the
court held that the Rehabilitation Act applied to Northwestern University, it
found that the university did not violate the Act with respect to athlete Nicholas
Knapp because the court deferred to the university’s determination that Knapp

173. Id. at 251–53.
174. Id. at 257.
175. Id. at 261–62. Most recently, in O’Bannon v. NCAA, the Ninth Circuit held that while the
NCAA is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the preservation of amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive basis for regulation. 802 F.3d 1049, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the court found
that restraints on cash payments in the form of deferred licensing payments to college athletes for the use
of their image and likeness was permitted, but that the NCAA must allow schools to provide
scholarships to players up to the full cost of attendance—something the NCAA had done while litigation
was pending. Id. at 1075; Melissa Lipman, NCAA Can Block Cash Payments to Athletes, 9th Circ. Says,
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/677977/ncaa-can-block-cashpayments-to-athletes-9th-circ-says.
176. Davis, supra note 18, at 234.
177. See, e.g., id.; infra notes 178, 180–81, 183.
178. 93 P.3d 621, 623–24 (Colo. App. 2004).
179. Id. at 628.
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was not an “otherwise qualified” athlete.180 In Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, the Supreme Court stated that drug testing high school athletes
constituted a search subject to the Fourth Amendment but held that the drug
testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment.181 Other courts have held
similarly in the intercollegiate and interscholastic contexts, deferring to sports
regulators to set the terms of participation.182
Perhaps the highest-profile example of law directed to sports is Title IX.
Although the statute itself does not mention sports,183 the regulations and policy
clarifications that make up the law of Title IX all are directed at educationbased sports programs. Title IX’s central purpose is to require institutions to
provide “equal athletic opportunit[ies]” to male and female students,184 and its
impact in changing the face of education-based sports programs is
undeniable.185 However, even Title IX, which is considered one of the most
important government initiatives with respect to sports, does not regulate the
180. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996).
181. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
182. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (holding
that NCAA rule against undue influence in recruitment of middle school students for athletic programs
did not violate the First Amendment); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182
(1988) (holding that the NCAA would not be held liable for university disciplinary actions against a
coach in compliance with NCAA rules because they did not constitute state action); Cureton v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 198 F.3d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (ruling that the NCAA did not have
controlling authority over its members in this Title VI action; therefore, regulations protecting against
disparate impact discrimination only applied to individual programs that the NCAA did not have control
over); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (rendering claims
moot if they addressed the NCAA rule withdrawing an athlete’s eligibility for signing professional
contracts violated the Sherman Act); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir.
1982) (rejecting a free exercise challenge by Orthodox Jewish basketball player that baned headwear
during games); Shelton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976)
(reversing decision to suspend enforcement of rule that declared a college basketball player who signed
a professional contract ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to
NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility requirements); Tatum v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 992 F.
Supp. 1114, 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (denying student’s claim for preliminary injunction against the
NCAA for administering tests that triggered the student’s generalized anxiety disorder); Ganden v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (denying
preliminary injunction against NCAA that prohibited a collegiate swimmer from participating in
competitions because of a learning disability); Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp.
738, 739 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding NCAA rules were not subject to antitrust analysis).
183. The statute states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
184. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (2015).
185. Dionne L. Koller, Not Just One of the Boys: A Post-Feminist Critique of Title IX’s Vision for
Gender Equity in Sports, 43 CONN. L. REV. 403, 405–07 (2010).
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actual content of sports programs themselves. Instead, the law requires that
programs meet the regulatory definition of providing “equal athletic
opportunity” for men and women.186 Title IX does not require that covered
educational programs give preferential treatment to women,187 have the same
sports teams for men and women,188 or spend equally on men and women’s
sports.189 The law only requires that where a school has separate programs for
men and women, those opportunities must be equitable.190 Importantly,
however, while the equality mandate itself has been defined through case law
and Title IX’s implementing regulations and policy clarifications, institutions
that sponsor athletic programs define the content of that equality mandate.191
None of these apparent areas of exception, where law seemingly is directed
at or applied to sports, regulates the content or purpose of sports programs—
what sports are played, the rules of play, the athletic eligibility of those who
wish to participate, or otherwise how sports themselves are conducted and
managed.192 Also significant is that none of these apparent areas of exception
are aimed at defining the content or purpose of youth and amateur sports

186. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c); 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c).
187. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n. v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Neal v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999) (“After all, § 1681(b)
states that Title IX does not require ‘any education institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment
to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported
program or activity.’”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894–95 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that
Title IX prohibits gender discrimination but it shall not “be interpreted to require any educational
institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number of persons or percentage of persons of that
sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally support program or activity, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of person of that sex in any community, State, section, or other
area”); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 908 (M.D. La. 1996) (“After establishing that sex
discrimination is prohibited, Title IX then proceeds to clarify that efforts to remedy historical sex
discrimination shall not include preferential or disparate treatment of one sex over another.”), aff’d in
part & rev’d in part, 201 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 213 F.3d 858 (5th
Cir. 2000).
188. Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title
-ix-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
189. See id.
190. See Mary Frances O’Shea, Dear Colleague Letter: Bowling Green State University, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC. (July 23, 1998), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html.
191. The Office for Civil Rights has explained that the three-part test allows institutions to maintain
“flexibility and affords them control over their athletic programs.” Russlynn Ali, Dear Colleague
Letter, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 13 (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague20100420.html; see Koller, supra note 185, at 403.
192. See Ali, supra note 191.
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programs differently from the content and purpose articulated by the private
actors who structure, manage, and staff such programs.193 Accordingly, the
government’s relationship to sports in the United States is primarily
characterized by initiatives aimed at enhancing the sports industry, facilitating
its popular appeal, and protecting those who make the games happen. Law,
then, has been effectively used in the service of sports, or more specifically in
the service of the goals of sports leagues, administrators, and regulators. By
and large, the government has not used sports in the service of other public
values.
The legal and policy response to concussions in sports, however, can be
viewed as an exception. As explained below, several factors combined to put
the issue of concussions in sports, at both the youth and professional levels, on
state and national government agendas. This has resulted in a legal and policy
response that is worth evaluating for three reasons. First, the concussion issue
has challenged the widely held view that law and government have only a
limited role to play in sports. Second, the concussion issue has led some to
rethink a widely held sports norm that violence and injury to players, and
subsequently playing while injured, is a fundamental aspect of sports. Third,
and perhaps most significantly, the concussion issue has provided a blueprint
for future government initiatives aimed at sports, particularly in the youth and
amateur context.
III. THE LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSE TO CONCUSSIONS IN SPORTS
The legal and policy response to concussions in sports includes statutes,
proposed federal legislation, and “bully pulpit” initiatives by the President and
Congress. It is significant not just because it is high-profile government action
aimed at sports but because it is wide reaching. It is government involvement
that is occurring across varying legal and policy platforms, crossing sports
contexts, and covering more than just players in a single sport.
A. Defining the Problem
As a threshold matter, it is important to understand how concussions,
unlike so many other sports issues, broke through the usual “hands off”
approach and developed to the point of prompting legal change. Public policy
scholars offer useful explanations for the way law is shaped through
193. See id.
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exploration of the theory of “problem definition.”194 Problem definition is
concerned with “what we choose to identify as public issues” and the resulting
characterization of such issues in the political process.195 Problem definition
explains how social problems rise or fall on the government’s agenda, and it
explains the legal solutions that result from the legislative process.196
Policy scholars have explained that before a law is enacted, social
conditions must be defined as public “problems” that reach the government’s
policy agenda.197 A public problem is defined as a “condition or situation that
produces needs or dissatisfaction among people and for which relief or redress
by governmental action is sought.”198 Policy scholars have explained that
social conditions do not, without more, become policy problems.199
Instead, Professors Baumgartner and Jones stated that “arguments must be
made and accepted that a given problem can be solved by government action”
before a social condition can ripen into a policy problem.200 Thus,
“[c]onditions become defined as problems when we believe we should do
something about them.”201 The actual process of a condition being defined as a
problem is a result of interpretation, and this “translation” happens as a result of
the values that shape one’s perceptions and whether, consistent with those
values, government action should be used to address the issue.202 Problem
definition is not just important in the political process; it is important to
understanding the resulting legal solution.203
194. DAVID A. ROCHEFORT &
THE POLICY AGENDA 4 (1994).

ROGER W. COBB, THE POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION: SHAPING

195. Id. at vii.
196. Id.
197. John M. Strate et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Politics of Problem Definition, 10
MORTALITY 23, 25 (2005) (stating that “[h]ow problems are defined ultimately determines the policy
decisions reached by government and the content of public policy.”); B. Dan Wood & Alesha Doan, The
Politics of Problem Definition: Applying and Testing Threshold Models, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 640, 640
(2003).
198. JAMES E. ANDERSON, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 85 (7th ed. 2010).
199. Id. at 640.
200. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 27 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that “before a problem is likely to attract the attention of
government officials, there must be an image, or an understanding, that links the problem with a possible
governmental solution”).
201. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 109 (1995).
202. Id. at 110–11.
203. Janet A. Weiss, The Powers of Problem Definition: The Case of Government Paperwork, 22
POL’Y SCI. 97, 97–98 (1989) (“Z problem definition at the outset of the policy process has implications
for later stages: which kinds of evidence bear on the problem, which solutions are considered effective
and feasible, . . . how policies are implemented, and by which criteria policies are assessed . . . .
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In the case of sports concussions, the “condition” that players endured head
trauma as part of the game was translated into a “problem” that government
should address for several reasons. First, there were numerous powerful
personal narratives involving both professional and youth players. The one
most credited with providing the impetus for state legislation was the narrative
of Zackery Lystedt.204 In October 2006, Lystedt suffered a concussion after
making a routine tackle during a school football game.205 Coaches allowed
Lystedt to return to the game, and he suffered a severe brain injury that left him
with permanent disabilities.206 In the years following the injury, the Lystedt
family successfully lobbied for passage of the “Lystedt Law” in Washington
State,207 which serves as a model for other state statutes.208
The issue also benefitted from the NFL’s lobbying activities.209 After
Washington State enacted the Lystedt Law, the NFL (and later the NCAA)
worked to adopt similar laws in all states and the District of Columbia.210
Significantly, the NFL advanced the Lystedt Law as the driving narrative for
sports concussion reform because the Lystedt Law defined the issue as one of
preventing re-injury to the harm already done.211 Commentators have
explained that this definition of the problem “directed attention away from a
different public health problem—the initial injury.”212 By doing so, sports
concussion initiatives did not seek to directly change the games themselves as a
way of decreasing the actual incidence of concussions.213
[P]roblem definition is more than the overture to the real action; it is often at the heart of the action
itself.”).
204. Andrew W. Breck, Keeping Your Head on Straight: Protecting Indiana Youth Athletes from
Traumatic Brain Injuries Through “Return-to-Play” Legislation, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 215, 216–17
(2012).
205. See id. at 216.
206. Kevin Brandwein, Goals and Obstacles in Legislating Concussion Management in Youth Sports,
10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 28, 29 (2013).
207. Breck, supra note 204, at 217.
208. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 29 (stating that Washington’s statute “has become the model” for
subsequent state sports concussion legislation).
209. Hosea H. Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 66, 103
(2014) (explaining that “it seems more likely than not that the NFL’s message and influencing served as
one key motivation for the adoption of youth sports [traumatic brain injury] laws”).
210. Id. at 86, 100.
211. Id. at 86, 102–03.
212. Id. at 102.
213. Id. Indeed, “youth sports concussion laws are remarkably uniform across states,” and all the
laws “focus on secondary prevention efforts to mitigate the downstream effects of concussions” rather
than preventing the initial injury. Kerri McGowan Lowrey & Stephanie R. Morain, State Experiences
Implementing Youth Sports Concussion Laws: Challenges, Successes, and Lessons for Evaluating
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As explained below, the legal process also played a crucial role in telling
the stories and amplifying the scientific evidence of the harms of sports
concussions. Former professional and college athletes brought claims detailing
the alleged effects of sports concussions and mismanagement by team and
league officials, which helped translate the issue from a “condition” to a
“problem.”214 These personal narratives combined with emerging medical
research that evidenced the harm done by sports concussions as well as the
risks to athletes when concussions are not taken seriously.215
Thus, the public transformation of the concussion issue, from an inherent
feature of sports to a problem for government to address, resulted from “an
increased public awareness respecting the threat posed by sports-related
concussions, particularly in young athletes” and the view, supported most
visibly by the NFL, that the government should take action to prevent the
harm.216
B. The Legal and Policy Response to Concussions: Statutes, Litigation, and
the “Bully Pulpit”
In a recent report, the Institute of Medicine stated that “few issues at the
intersection of medicine and sports . . . have generated as much public interest
as sports-related concussions,” especially among youth.217 Although there is
some scientific debate over the exact definition, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention define a concussion as a type of traumatic brain injury that is
caused by a “bump, blow or jolt to the head or body” that causes the head to
move back and forth rapidly.218 Sports most commonly associated with

Impact, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 290, 290 (2014). Note that this approach also likely serves to legitimize
the game of football by cultivating a sense that the game is not inherently dangerous, but its risks can be
controlled through government regulation. Id.; see LOWE, supra note 33, at 81 (explaining that
regulation can give a sport an “importance” and a “legitimacy”).
214. See Settlement, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md02323-AB, 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 7849 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2013); Brandwein, supra note 206, at 29.
215. Marie-France Wilson, Young Athletes at Risk: Preventing and Managing Consequences of Sports
Concussions in Young Athletes and the Related Legal Issues, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 241, 243–48
(2010) (explaining medical overview of the concussion issue).
216. Id. at 248.
217. COMMITTEE ON SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH ET AL., SPORTS-RELATED
CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH: IMPROVING THE SCIENCE, CHANGING THE CULTURE 19 (Robert Graham et al.
eds., 2014) [hereinafter SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH].
218. Basic Information About Traumatic Brain Injury and Concussion, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/basics.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2016).
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concussions are football, soccer, ice hockey, and lacrosse.219
The legal and policy response to concussions addresses this issue through a
combination of state statutes, proposed federal legislation, significant tort
litigation, and “bully pulpit” initiatives, such as a White House Summit and
congressional hearings. All fifty states and the District of Columbia now have
some type of concussion legislation aimed at youth sports.220 The rationale for
aiming reform at youth sports is the “unique” situation presented by
concussions suffered by children.221 Medical research suggests that children
are more vulnerable to concussions and the risk of re-injury.222 Additionally,
youth recreational and school sports often do not have team doctors and athletic
trainers to assist with concussion diagnosis and management.223 Return-to-play
guidelines also are considered important in preventing what is known as
Second Impact Syndrome, which is where an athlete suffers an initial
concussion and returns to play before it is fully healed.224
The first of these statutes, the Lystedt Law, includes three core features that
became the blueprint for youth concussion legislation in other states225 and are
considered key to limiting the harm from concussions.226 The first is promoting
awareness through statutes that in varying degrees mandate that athletes,
parents, and coaches be educated about the dangers of concussions, such as by
signing a concussion awareness form.227 The second principle requires that an
athlete be removed from play if the athlete suffers, or is suspected of suffering,
a concussion.228 Finally, the statutes mandate that athletes may not return to
play until twenty-four hours after being removed for a concussion and until
receiving sufficient medical clearance.229 Beyond this, many states require
coaches to receive concussion training and mandate the development of
policies for use within school districts.230
The statutes do not aim to prevent concussions in sports because they do
219. SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH, supra note 217, at 4.
220. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Shilpa Kadoo, A Heads-Up on Traumatic Brain Injuries in Sports, 17 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 155, 184 (2014).
221. Wilson, supra note 215, at 241.
222. Id. at 242.
223. Id.
224. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 37–38 (explaining Second Impact Syndrome).
225. Harvey, supra note 209, at 66, 86.
226. Hodge & Kadoo, supra note 220, at 184.
227. Harvey, supra note 209, at 89–90.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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not ban certain high-risk sports (such as football) or limit sports activity that
might produce concussions (such as football tackles, soccer “headers,” or ice
hockey body checking).231 Instead, the statutes aim to mitigate the severity of
the harm from concussions by mandating a response once it is suspected that an
athlete has suffered a concussion.232 Thus, one scholar has explained that “key
features across all youth sports [Traumatic Brain Injury] laws include a focus
on secondary, not primary prevention” and that all states generally relied on the
three-pronged Lystedt Law model “with minimal policy experimentation.”233
Members of Congress have proposed several bills that would address
concussions in sports.234 For instance, the proposed Concussion Treatment and
Care Tools Act (ConTACT Act)235 has three main provisions: First, the law
would direct the Department of Health and Human Services, through the
Centers for Disease Control, to develop uniform concussion management
guidelines for school-aged children, including return-to-play standards.236
Second, the bill would provide for state grant funding for schools to implement
concussion guidelines and assist with staff training.237 Third, it would establish
data collection on the number of states that have adopted the uniform
concussion management guidelines and the number of students suffering
concussions.238
231. Id. at 89 (explaining that “[t]here are no states that have banned traditional youth sports with high
[traumatic brain injury] risks or that have set out legal regimes attempting to govern particular sports
techniques by legislation or regulatory oversight”).
232. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 37 (explaining Second Impact Syndrome).
233. Harvey, supra note 209, at 89–90.
234. Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2015, H.R. 2062, 114th Cong. (2015);
Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2015, S. 988, 114th Cong. (2015); National
Traumatic Brain Injury Research and Treatment Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 1420, 114th Cong.
(2015); Concussion Awareness and Education Act of 2015, H.R. 1271, 114th Cong. (2015); Protecting
Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2013, S. 1546, 113th Cong. (2013) (promoting minimum
state requirements for the prevention and treatment of concussions by participation in school sports);
Youth Sports Concussion Act, H.R. 2118, 113th Cong. (2013); Youth Sports Concussion Act, S. 1014,
113th Cong. (2013). These are distinct from the Traumatic Brain Injury Act that awards federal funds to
states through a grant process to promote TBI research and access to resources for individuals with TBI.
Traumatic Brain Injury Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-206, 122 Stat. 714.
235. Concussion Treatment and Care Tools (ConTACT) Act of 2015, H.R. 582, 114th Cong. (2015);
ConTACT Act of 2015, S. 307, 114th Cong. (2015); ConTACT Act of 2013, S. 1516, 113th Cong.
(2013); ConTACT Act of 2013, H.R. 3113, 113th Cong. (2013). These bills would amend Title II of the
Public Health Service Act to provide for the establishment and implementation of guidelines on best
practices for diagnosis, treatment, and management of mild traumatic brain injuries in school-aged
children.
236. S. 307.
237. Id.
238. Id.

713

[Vol. 43: 681, 2016]

Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

The narratives driving the proposed federal legislation focus on the
concussion “epidemic,” the risks to children, and the connection to education.
In explaining the need for federal action, Representative George Miller stated
that “[m]ore than 140,000 high-school athletes sustain a concussion each year,
according to the National Federation of State High School Association, and
more than 40 percent of these athletes return to play before they are fully
recovered.”239 Inconsistency among state statutes is driving the federal
proposals, as is the fact that most state statutes do not address the issue of
returning to the classroom: “[T]he focus must not be return to play, but return
to learn.”240 Congressional hearings also focused on sports-related concussions
and the connection to education.241 In a hearing on the Protecting Student
Athletes from Concussions Act, Representative John Kline stated: “We know
that what happens on the field can directly affect what happens in the
classroom.”242
Other bills focus heavily on establishing systems to collect accurate data on
the incidence of sports-related concussions.243 Some members of Congress
have taken the sports-concussion issue even further, proposing initiatives such
as a “Secondary School Student Athletes’ Bill of Rights” to “protect studentathletes from the dangers of sports-related concussions” and encourage schools
to adopt practices that “prevent and address student-athlete injuries.”244 Sports
concussions also have been the cornerstone for broader proposed reforms of
intercollegiate athletics programs. For instance, the Collegiate Student Athlete
Protection Act would require that institutions whose athletic programs generate
more than $10 million in revenue per year must give their athletes “increased
protections against concussions, increased protection against scholarship
reductions and increased accountability on the institutions to provide for better

239. George Miller, Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act, COMMITTEE ON EDUC.
WORKFORCE (Sept. 2013), http://www.riverheadlocal.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/timbishop.house
.gov_uploads_Concussion%20fact%20sheets.pdf.
240. Id.
241. Kline Statement: Hearing on the “Protections Student Athletes from Concussions Act”,
COMMITTEE ON EDUC. WORKFORCE (Sept. 23, 2010), http://edworkforce.house.gov/newsroom/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=208390.
242. Id.
243. Concussion Awareness and Education Act of 2015, H.R. 1271, 114th Cong. (2015).
244. Menendez Introduces Senate Resolution Supporting Safety and Well being of High School
Athletes, BOB MENENDEZ U.S. SENATOR N.J. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsand-events/press/menendez-introduces-senate-resolution-supporting-safety-and-well
being-of-highschool-athletes.
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academic support.”245 The combination of “yearly concussion tests, ensuring
stronger due process in scholarship reduction hearings and holding each team
accountable to graduate their student athletes within 4 years” aims to provide a
federal standard for protecting student-athletes both physically and
academically.246
The legal and policy response to concussions also included significant tort
litigation, some of which is still pending.247 The most notable were class action
lawsuits brought by former players against the NFL, NHL, NCAA, and FIFA
and U.S. Soccer.248 In general, these claims alleged that the relevant leagues
and governing bodies ignored the dangers of concussions and failed to adopt
policies and procedures that would protect players from harm.249 The relief
sought included damages, funding for future medical care, and implementation
of policies and rule changes to minimize the risk of harm to players.250
Plaintiffs also have brought individual claims against colleges and universities
and other sponsors of sports programs.251 Moreover, organizers attempting to
unionize college athletes in revenue-generating sports cited the need to
negotiate better protections for athletes who suffer concussions while
playing.252
Finally, the legal and policy response to concussions also includes several
“bully pulpit” initiatives.253 For instance, President Obama stated in 2013:

245. Collegiate Student Athlete Bill of Rights—Section by Section, CONGRESSMAN TONY CARDENAS
1, https://cardenas.house.gov/sites/cardenas.house.gov/files/CSAP%20Act%20Section%20by%20
Section%20PDF.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Eugenie Bouchard: Tennis Star Sues USTA After Concussion at U.S. Open, CNN (Oct.
15, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/15/tennis/eugenie-bouchard-lawsuit-usta-tennis-concussion/.
248. Evan Hilbert, FIFA, U.S. Soccer Named in Class-Action Concussion Lawsuit, CBS SPORTS
(Aug. 27, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/general/eye-on-sports/24682496/fifa-us-soccernamed-in-class-action-concussion-lawsuit.
249. See id.; supra note 10 and accompanying text.
250. Hilbert, supra note 248.
251. See, e.g., M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., No. 14-04877 PJ, 2015 WL 1893264 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 27, 2015); Croce v. West Chester Sch. Dist., No. 13-6831, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45665 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 8, 2015); DuRocher v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:13-cv-01570-SEB-DML, 2015 WL
1505675 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2015); Pyka v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00057-wmc
(W.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2015) (parties stipulated to dismissal Oct. 27, 2015); Duerson v. Nat’l Football
League, No. 12 C 2513 JFH, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Baggay v. Linfield Christian Sch., No.
D066859 RLT, 2015 WL 1311084 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).
252. Solotaroff, supra note 14 (explaining that the concussion issue “galvanized” Ramogi Huma, who
is leading the movement to unionize college athletes).
253. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 1–2.
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[I]f I had a son, I’d have to think long and hard before I let him play
football. And I think that those of us who love the sport are going to
have to wrestle with the fact that it will probably change gradually to
try to reduce some of the violence.254
President Obama went on to note his particular concern for college
athletes, stating: “You read some of these stories about college players who
undergo some of these same problems with concussions and so forth and then
have nothing to fall back on. That’s something I’d like to see the NCAA think
about.”255 In 2014, President Obama took the “unusual step”256 of convening
the Healthy Kids and Safe Sports Concussion Summit at the White House to
promote initiatives that increase awareness of sports concussions and study the
ways youth sports can be made safer.257 The legal and policy response to
concussions also includes related legislative actions and proposals, such as
congressional hearings on the NFL’s concussion policy,258 proposed federal
regulations for sports helmet manufacturers, and funding for further research.259
C. Evaluating the Legal and Policy Response to Concussions
1. The Skeptical View
There are significant critiques of the legal and policy response to
concussions.260 Primarily, critics discount the government’s legal and policy
response for being at best ineffective and at worst an example of “regulatory

254. Dan Diamond, President Obama Puts NCAA on Notice: Protect Your Student-Athletes, FORBES
(Jan. 27, 2013, 10:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2013/01/27/president-obama-putsncaa-on-notice-protect-your-student-athletes/.
255. Id.
256. Juliet Eilperin, Obama to Host a White House Summit on Growing Concerns over Sports Head
Injuries, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-to-host-awhite-house-summit-on-growing-conerns-over-sports-head-injuries/2014/05/28/d49e48ae-e5ac-11e3afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html.
257. Remarks by the President at the Healthy Kids and Safe Sports Concussion Summit, WHITE
HOUSE (May 29, 2014, 11:19 AM) [hereinafter Remarks by the President],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/29/remarks-president-healthy-kids-and-safesports-concussion-summit.
258. Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Part I & III): Hearing Before the H. Comm. of
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 113 (2010).
259. Children’s Sports Athletic Equipment Safety Act, S. 601, 112th Cong. (2011).
260. Harvey, supra note 209, at 104.
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capture.”261 From this perspective, the legal and policy response to concussions
in sports fits comfortably within the current sports law landscape—government
involvement that is meant to benefit the sports industry.262 Such a view
encompasses several important criticisms.
First, critics point out that the NFL lobbied heavily for state and federal
concussion legislation.263 Critics have explained that this led to legislative
outcomes that were “directly relevant to the NFL’s private commercial goals in
protecting the image and reputation of football.”264 The NFL’s significant
lobbying efforts were used to define the issue as reducing the harmful
consequences of concussions, not reducing the incidence of initial concussion
injuries. This ensured that legislative outcomes did not “directly regulat[e] the
content, rules, or procedures of football itself.”265 The NFL’s influence over
state concussion laws has been described as “a form of regulatory capture”
because of the way in which the laws serve to advance the NFL’s agenda.266
A second critique of concussion statutes is that, regardless of the
motivation behind the reforms, they are simply not effective.267 Public health
researchers have argued that the statutes do not do anything to limit the
incidence of concussions in youth sports.268 The statutes do not mandate any
changes to the games themselves, except to the extent that a player suspected of
261. Id. at 99.
262. See John C. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons from the Sports Industry,
44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 109–10 (1982).
263. Harvey, supra note 209, at 102–03; Amy L. Bernstein, Comment, Into the Red Zone: How the
National Football League’s Quest to Curb Concussions and Concussion-Related Injuries Could Affect
Players’ Legal Recovery, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 271, 275 (2012) (“In addition to the
policies implemented on the field and in the locker room, the NFL has gone to the United States
Congress and to various state legislatures in the hopes of encouraging more states to
adopt legislation that establishes a standard for identifying concussions for younger players and for
managing their recovery and return to the field.”); Settlement Tackles NFL Concussion Problem,
CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS WASH. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.citizensforethics.org/blog/entry/
settlement-tackles-nfl-concussion-problem (stating that “congressional attention to concussions was a
factor behind the league’s increased spending on lobbying and campaign contributions”); NFL, NCAA
Lobby for Concussion Laws, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2012), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/7454729/nfl-ncaaurge-states-pass-concussion-laws (“NFL commissioner Roger Goodell and NCAA president Mark
Emmert are urging 19 governors to support legislation this year aimed at cutting down on concussions in
youth football.”);
264. Harvey, supra note 209, at 102.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 99.
267. Maggie Clark, Sports Concussion Laws Are a Headache for States, GOVERNING (July 20, 2012),
http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct-sports-concussion-bills-headache-for-state-lawmakers.html.
268. Id. (explaining that “none of the legislative efforts has addressed prevention” and “[n]ot a single
piece of any of these laws is going to keep a kid from getting a concussion in the first place”).
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having a concussion must be removed from play.269 It, therefore, can be argued
that concussion statutes and other concussion management guidelines provide a
false sense of security to parents and athletes by giving the appearance that
safety can be regulated into the games as currently played, despite the scientific
evidence to the contrary.270 Moreover, because the statutes focus on managing
concussions that occur, taking as a given that they will occur,271 the concussion
statutes contribute to the calcified thinking around sports that the traditional
games, played in traditional ways, are the only authentic sports experiences.272
In addition to the statutes being criticized as ineffective from a public
health perspective, concussion statutes have also been criticized as being
legally ineffective.273 Legal scholars have asserted that because the statutes
have no enforcement mechanism,274 and some even include immunity
provisions for coaches and health professionals, there is little accountability for
failing to manage youth concussions as required.275 The causes of action
available to potential plaintiffs and immunities available to potential defendants
vary from state to state depending on the language of the concussion
legislation.276 However, most state statutes do not create any new cause of
action and are silent on liability.277 For example, Wisconsin (along with several
other states) includes provisions protecting coaches, officials, or volunteers
from liability if they fail to remove an athlete from competition unless there is
gross negligence or gross misconduct.278 The statute specifically states that it
“does not create any liability for, or a cause of action against, any person.”279
Similarly, concussion legislation in Texas offers no new cause of action and
gives express immunity to school district officials or employees, emergency

269. Harvey, supra note 209, at 96–98.
270. But see Brandwein, supra note 206, at 30 (explaining that state legislation is “properly focused
on an achievable goal of preventing [Second Impact Syndrome]”).
271. Harvey, supra note 209, at 107 (explaining that state concussion statutes “all take the existence
of a concussion for granted”).
272. Id.
273. Lowrey & Morain, supra note 213, at 294.
274. Id. at 290, 294.
275. Id. at 296.
276. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2011); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.151 (West
2011); WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2013).
277. Lowrey & Morain, supra note 213, at 296; see also Summary Matrix of State Laws Addressing
Concussions in Youth Sports, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L., http://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/7x
wh09/StateLawsTableConcussionsFINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
278. WIS. STAT. § 118.293.
279. Id.
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responders, and members of the concussion oversight team.280 Arizona’s
concussion legislation also offers express immunity for volunteer healthcare
providers making return-to-play decisions, the school district, its agents, and
others.281
The tort litigation that is a significant part of the legal and policy response
to concussions also is subject to the familiar critique that tort law is an
inefficient means of providing compensation for past harm and preventing
future concussions.282 A related critique reflects the “hands off” view of
government involvement in sports, with some scholars and others making the
case that the statutes and litigation are an unwarranted intrusion into sports
regulation.283 From this view, sports governing bodies and administrators are in
the best position to manage the concussion issue.284
Thus, the significance of the legal and policy response to concussions
might be discounted because in some respects it fits comfortably within the
current paradigm for government involvement in sports. The legal and policy
response to concussions, heavily driven by the NFL, can be viewed as simply
another example of law in support of the professional sports industry.
Moreover, it can be said that the statutes, litigation, and “bully pulpit”
initiatives only regulate at the margins of the games and, in so doing, serve to
restore confidence that games as traditionally constructed are safe to play,
despite considerable scientific evidence to the contrary. However, as explained
below, several features of the legal and policy response to concussions can have
an important impact on the future of sports regulation.
2. The Broader View: Changing the Future of Sports Regulation
Despite the valid critiques of the legal and policy response to sports
concussions, there is another perspective on the issue that is significant not only
for the management of sports concussions but also for all of sports law. The
legal and policy response to concussions evidences important breaks from the

280. TEX EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 38.151, 38.159.
281. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341.
282. Douglas E. Abrams, Confronting the Youth Sports Concussion Crisis: A Central Role for
Responsible Local Enforcement of Playing Rules, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 75, 82–83 (2013).
283. See Brandwein, supra note 206, at 38. But see Lowrey & Morain, supra note 213, at 296.
284. Abrams, supra note 282, at 82–83; see also IHSA Responds to Concussion Lawsuit, supra note
109 (“Those who oversee safety measures on a day-to-day basis are the people best equipped to address
these improvements, not those operating within the courts.”).
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usual sports law landscape.285 The result is that the legal and policy response to
concussions helps change sports norms that can provide a new pathway for
productive government regulation of youth and amateur sports in the future.286
Several aspects of the legal and policy response to concussions in sports
make it significant. First, the legal and policy response to concussions places
the government in a key position to prevent and remedy harm to athletes.287
Thus, with the legal and policy response to concussions, an aspect of sports was
successfully translated into a problem for government to solve. While it is
clear there is an element of “regulatory capture” to the statutory and bully
pulpit initiatives, it is equally apparent that the posture of the legal and policy
response to concussions is government action serving as a check on
problematic features of sports and not simply promoting or supporting sports.
This feature of the legal and policy response to concussions is made even more
powerful because of the fact that the response is not limited to an individual
sport. Unlike targeted antitrust exemptions or niche legislation in areas such as
boxing, the legal and policy response to concussions places government—
courts, Congress, state legislatures, and the executive branch—in the heart of
multiple sports at multiple levels.288
In addition, the statutes are aimed at youth, and not professional, sports.
This is an important break from the privatized “Wild West” tradition of youth
and amateur sports in the United States.289 Rather than simply using law and
policy to foster individual achievement and urge participation in youth and
amateur sports, the legal and policy response to concussions evidences a
government interest in promoting athletes’ well being.290 Moreover, although
they do not ban any sport or specific practices in sports that can cause
concussions, the state statutes regulate how youth sports are played. They do
so by essentially determining that a certain category of players—those
suspected of suffering a concussion—are ineligible to continue playing in the

285. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 53.
286. It also contributes to advancing the sports law field because it adds to the growing body of law
dedicated to sport.
287. See Charles Barwald, Practicing Concussion Prevention: Enacting State Legislation Regulating
Contact in High School Football Practices, 37 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 352, 355 (2015); Lowrey &
Morain, supra note 213, at 293.
288. Lowrey & Morain, supra note 213, at 292; see Brandwein, supra note 206, at 39–41.
289. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 33–34.
290. Christine M. Baugh et al., Requiring Athletes to Acknowledge Receipt of Concussion-Related
Information and Responsibility to Report Symptoms: A Study of the Prevalence, Variation, and Possible
Improvements, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 297, 309 (2014); Brandwein, supra note 206, at 42.
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game or practice in which the suspected concussion occurred.291 These players
are also ineligible to return to play or practice until cleared by a suitable
medical professional.292 This feature of the state statutes goes to the heart of
the “field of play,”293 and determinations of who may take the field, and who
may not, have traditionally been an issue reserved for coaches, administrators,
and referees.294
Perhaps most importantly, the wide reach of the legal and policy response
to concussions in sports also is contributing toward a redefinition of traditional
sports norms that will have an impact beyond the issue of concussions.295
Specifically, the legal and policy response to concussions is challenging the
notion that there are certain “inherent” features of sports, such as the “play with
pain” norm, that has been taken for granted as part of the game.296 Moreover,
the legal and policy response to concussions is causing us to rethink the role of
government in sports in ways we have not before.
We know that law can have an important impact on changing cultural
norms. Scholars have explained that “[t]here can be no doubt that law, like
action in general, has an expressive function” and that its expressive dimension
goes beyond its coercive effects.297 Thus, the expressive theory of the law
“focuses on what law says rather than the sanctions that law threatens.”298 Law

291. WASH. REV. CODE § 28a.600.190(3) (2015); Harvey, supra note 209, at 86.
292. WASH. REV. CODE § 28a.600.190(4).
293. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 49 (stating that the removal from play mandate in concussion
statutes “takes the decision of when a student should return to competition out of the hands of coaches,
players, and parents”). The Court of Arbitration for Sport has also developed a law explaining the
insulation of the “field of play” from further interference or review. See Richard McLaren, The CAS Ad
Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175, 191 (2004).
294. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 38.
295. Baugh et al., supra note 290, at 310.
296. Justin P. Caldarone, Professional Team Doctors: Money, Prestige, and Ethical Dilemmas, 9
SPORTS L.J. 131, 142–43 (2002).
297. Cass R. Sunstein, Law, Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2051 (1996); see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) (arguing that constitutional law
doctrines can “best [be] understood through the conception [people] develop of the expressive
dimensions of state action”); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 35, 37 (2002) (developing “a positive ‘belief change’ theory of law’s effect on social norms and
preference”); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339–
40 (2000) (“[The] law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society.
Because people are motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the information signaled by
legislation and other law affects their behavior.”).
298. Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1046
(2005).
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is said to create public meanings and shared understandings between the
government and the public.299 Law has the ability to communicate important
value judgments and can serve to educate individuals about socially preferred
or harmful behavior.300 Law then may cause individuals to change their
behavior by “signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society.”301
“Because people are motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the
information signaled by legislation and other law” can cause individuals to
change their behavior to conform to popular norms.302 Court decisions also
have an expressive effect because they too “often reflect public attitudes.”303
Accordingly, because individuals value approval,304 law can affect behavior by
signaling what behavior will generate approval,305 which causes individuals “to
update their prior beliefs about the approval pattern.”306 As a result, many
scholars have explained that the law has the power to shape social norms307 and
influence behavior.308
The legal and policy response to concussions is causing people to rethink
what were previously unchallenged assumptions about sports and the prevailing
model for sports, specifically that features of sports, such as playing through
pain and injury, are simply “part of the game.”309 It also is causing us to
rethink the notion that the government has little role to play in regulating
sports.310 Our current legal structure supports a model for sports that values
299. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 297, at 1503, 1571.
300. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 949 (1996).
301. McAdams, supra note 297, at 339–40.
302. Id. at 340; Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 755 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 297, at 2021–22.
303. McAdams, supra note 297, at 341.
304. McAdams asserts that “[t]here are at least two reasons why approval motivates behavior. An
individual may value approval intrinsically because it satisfies a preference for esteem or instrumentally
because it helps to achieve other ends.” Id. at 343.
305. Id. at 342.
306. Id. at 365.
307. Id. at 371.
308. See Geisinger, supra note 297, at 37 (explaining that “scholars note that laws affect behavior not
only by making the behavior more costly, but also by affecting social norms and, consequently, by
changing an individual’s preferences for undertaking particular acts”); McAdams, supra note 297, at 389
(explaining that “[i]n a democratic society, legislation and other law can change what people believe
about the approval patterns in their community or society; the law operates as a signal of popular
opinion”); Sunstein, supra note 297, at 2021 (arguing that the expressive function of law shapes social
norms).
309. Abrams, supra note 282, at 95 (explaining the ethic of playing through injuries rather than
reporting suspected concussions).
310. Id. at 107.
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winning and commercial appeal311 with little role for the state. An important
feature of the win-at-all-costs model is glorifying athletes who play despite
injury and keeping talented players in the game, despite the physical harm. In
football, for instance, “sitting out during an injury is often viewed as weak and
lacking the requisite toughness” and playing through pain and injury is “viewed
as the action of a warrior who embodies the ethos of sport.”312 Commentators
have explained that it is “a common mantra shared by many athletes that they
should push themselves beyond their normal endurances,” which includes
“playing with a variety of injuries.”313
The President and members of Congress have recognized these norms as
being particularly dangerous for children. For instance, at the White House’s
Healthy Kids and Safe Sports Concussion Summit, President Obama stated
that, with respect to head injuries, “[w]e have to change a culture that says you
suck it up.”314 Congressman Hank Johnson discussed the “old mantra of
perseverance” and “[w]alking off the pain” as having an enormous influence on
children, who view it as “noble behavior of their football heroes.”315
Commentators have described the need for norm change regarding concussion
management to create a new understanding among parents, coaches, sports
administrators, and athletes themselves that a head injury is not simply “part of
the game” but a serious injury that must be addressed.316 Concussion statutes
that mandate education and awareness are a key part of this culture shift.317
Similarly, in congressional testimony on the crisis of youth sports concussions,
Dr. Robert Graham stated that a “culture shift” was needed because the
seriousness of sports concussions was not appreciated by “athletes, their
311. See Promoting the Well being and Academic Success of College Athletes: Opening Statement,
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COM., SCI., & TRANSP. (Jul. 9, 2014), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/hearings?Id=48f489fd-720f-44d7-8a68-53efaecf8139&Statement_id=B7CFF2CE8C4A-4D60-9724-86E6700EC9B7 (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp.) (stating that in college athletes there are “strong incentives to win at any
cost” and that the revenue generated by teams is put back into the programs “to perpetuate that cycle of
winning”).
312. Jimmy Sanderson et al., A Hero or Sissy? Exploring Media Framing of NFL Quarterbacks
Injury Decisions, 2014 COMM. & SPORT 2.
313. Hodge & Kadoo, supra note 220, at 160.
314. See Remarks by the President, supra note 257.
315. Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Part I & II): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 18–19 (2009) (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
316. Wilson, supra note 215, at 241, 253.
317. Brandwein, supra note 206, at 28, 42 (explaining the ways that educating athletes, parents, and
coaches will go a long way toward changing the “macho culture” around sports).
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teammates, . . . coaches and parents.”318 Dr. Graham acknowledged the
importance of concussion management statutes in the needed culture change.319
Moreover, some members of Congress see concussion management laws as
being an important step in furthering culture change in youth sports.320
Concussion litigation also has an important influence on sports norms. As
with other areas of the law, tort law does not easily fit within the sports context,
at least with respect to players.321 Co-participant liability generally is limited to
cases of recklessness in order not to chill the physical nature of the games.322
Moreover, the doctrine of assumption of the risk is frequently employed to
prevent an athlete from recovering for injuries sustained while engaging in
conduct that courts consider an inherent part of the game.323 The concussion
issue is challenging our traditionally held understandings of what is an inherent
feature of our favorite professional and amateur sports and is, therefore, outside
of the reach of law and public policy. The class action complaints brought by
former professional and intercollegiate athletes are employing the legal system
to redefine what has been considered an inherent feature of sports—playing
while injured—as a tort and using the legal process to tell the stories of sports
concussion harm.324 These narratives in the context of litigation and the media
attention to them are changing norms, defining the problem by moving the
issue from sport to tort, and translating previously accepted norms of the game
into credible legal claims.325
318. Robert Graham, Sports-Related Concussions in Youth: Improving the Science, Changing the
Culture, NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENGINEERING & MED. 2 (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/OCGA/113Session2/testimonies/OCGA_149811
(testimony
of
Robert Graham, M.D., Director of Aligning Forces for Quality at George Washington University).
319. Id.
320. Durbin Urges Schools Across the Nation to Develop Concussion Safety Plans for StudentAthletes, DICK DURBIN U.S. SENATOR ILL. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/durbin-urges-schools-across-the-nation-to-develop-concussion-safety-plans-for-studentathletes (stating that “young athletes don’t want to let their coaches or teammates down, so helping
them . . . recognize the signs and symptoms of concussion can go a long way toward prioritizing a
player’s safety”).
321. Davis, supra note 18, at 230–31.
322. Id.; see 114 AM. JUR. Trials § 3 (2009); MITTEN ET AL., supra note 69, at 917; David E. Lazaroff,
Torts & Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participants for Injuries Sustained During Competition, 7 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 191, 198 (1990).
323. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 69, at 918.
324. Id. at 919.
325. See, e.g., Mehr v. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n, No. 14-cv-3879-PJH, 2015 WL
4366044 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015); Ripple v. Marble Falls Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-CV-827-DAE, 2015
WL 1640554 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2015); In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 2014). This is the case even though some of the claims have been
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For instance, in the NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation,326 the
players alleged that the NFL promotes football by glorifying “the brutality and
ferocity of” the game by “lauding and mythologizing the most brutal and
ferocious players and collisions, and simultaneously propagating the fraudulent
representation that ‘getting your bell rung,’ ‘being dinged,’ and putting big hits
on others is a badge of courage and does not seriously threaten one’s health.”327
The complaint also alleged that the NFL “propagated the false myth that
collisions of all kinds . . . many of which lead to short-term and long-term
neurological damage . . . are an acceptable, desired, and natural consequence of
the game, and a measure of the courage and heroism of players involved at
every level of the game.”328
Similarly, in Arrington v. NCAA,329 the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA
failed to protect players from the risk and effects of concussions across multiple
sports.330 The complaint alleged that the NCAA had assumed a duty to protect
athletes given its stated mission to “protect and enhance the physical and
educational well being of the student athlete” and that the NCAA ignored the
concussion issue.331 Moreover, the complaint alleged that the NCAA kept all
revenues generated by intercollegiate athletics and provided “no medical or
financial support to collegiate student-athletes who sustained concussions while
playing an NCAA sport.”332 The complaint went on to detail the particular
concussion injuries sustained by the lead plaintiffs in the sports of football,
soccer, and ice hockey.333
In Ripple v. Marble Falls Independent School District,334 former high

dismissed or settled. The claims themselves have been taken seriously by the media, fans, and leagues,
and changes have resulted. See Mehr, 2015 WL 4366044; see also, e.g., Ballard v. Nat’l Football
League Players Ass’n, No. 4:14-CV-1267 CDP, 2015 WL 4920329, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2015)
(granting a motion to dismiss all charges because the court found that the claims were preempted and
untimely); Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 17, 2014) (dismissing claims based on preemption but stressing that the ruling “does not minimize
the underlying societal issue”).
326. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 710.
327. Pls.’ Am. Master Administrative Long-Form Compl. ¶ 50, In re Nat’l Football League Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, 2012 WL 2045382 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012).
328. Id. ¶ 51.
329. Arrington v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
330. Pls.’ Second Am. Class Action Compl. ¶¶ 6–14, Arrington v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. 11-cv-06356, 2013 WL 7175390 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2013).
331. Id.
332. Id. ¶ 15.
333. Id. ¶¶ 21–73.
334. Ripple v. Marble Falls Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-CV-827-DAE, 2015 WL 1640554 (W.D. Tex.
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school football player Blake Ripple alleged that he “suffered numerous
concussions or sub-concussions while under the supervision” of the school’s
football coach and that the coach and other staff continued to put Ripple into
games and practices when they knew Ripple was “injured and was in a fragile
condition,” causing long-term injury.335 The complaint details that Ripple, a
one-time National Honor Society student, is unable to live independently or go
to college.336
Finally, and most recently, in Mehr v. Federation Internationale de
Football Ass’n,337 several athletes brought a class action claim against FIFA—
the international governing body for soccer—the United States Soccer
Federation, and other soccer defendants alleging that these entities failed to
have concussion management and return-to-play guidelines.338 The plaintiffs
also alleged that the governing bodies for soccer failed to adopt rule changes
“to account for proper concussion management.”339 Specifically, the plaintiffs
claimed that the governing bodies for soccer ignored substantial medical
research and failed to adopt rules that addressed the risk of brain injury from
repetitive heading by players younger than seventeen.340 The plaintiffs also
alleged that FIFA’s rule limiting substitutions in soccer matches led to an
increase in the number of concussions and exacerbates the risks of multiple
concussions in a match.341
In addition to challenging the notion that playing with a head injury is an
inherent feature of some sports, one of the most important future effects of the
legal response to concussions is that it can help erode the tendency to treat
sports—the types of games, the way they are played, and the very purpose of
sports—as somehow fundamental, essential, and not subject to change.342 This
Mar. 27, 2015).
335. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. ¶ 2, Ripple v. Marble Falls Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 12-CV-00827, 2013 WL
3486411 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2013).
336. Id. ¶ 3.
337. See Mehr v. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n, No. 14-cv-3879-PJH, 2015 WL 4366044
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015).
338. Pls.’ Class Action Compl. ¶ 32, Mehr v. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n, No. 14-cv-3879,
2014 WL 4214853 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014).
339. Id. ¶ 267.
340. Id. ¶ 375.
341. Id. ¶¶ 384–85.
342. D. STANLEY EITZEN, FAIR AND FOUL: BEYOND THE MYTHS AND PARADOXES OF SPORT 55 (5th
ed. 2012) (explaining that “tradition” is the primary reason that teams and fans resist change of offensive
team names and mascots); id. at 250–51 (noting most have a vested interest in the sports status quo, and,
despite the problems in sport, “the vast majority of fans continue to support the sports establishment
uncritically”); Brandwein, supra note 206, at 28, 43 (stating that “it is difficult to change the culture
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thinking forms the backbone of the traditional “part of the game” response to
concussions. The assumption is that something that is “part of the game”
cannot be altered.343
Courts often recognize certain aspects of sport as “fundamental” parts of
the game.344 Such entrenched thinking about the fundamental nature of sports
is seen in everything from casual commentary to case law and carries not just
the power of tradition345 but also gender norms because preserving the games as
they are maintains their masculine qualities.346 For instance, in the debate over
concussions in football, particularly at the youth level, commentators have
argued that the rules cannot be changed to eliminate or reduce tackling because
it is an inherent part of the game.347 A bill in the New York state legislature
proposing to ban tackle football for children younger than fourteen had “little
support,” with critics stating that the need was not to change the game but to

surrounding something like sports that is steeped in tradition”).
343. See Jeff Nussbaum, How to Bring Pro Football into the 21st Century, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 29,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/01/suggestions-for-safer-football/
384890/ (“The injuries suffered by today’s NFL are injuries inflicted by set design: an unwillingness on
the part of the league to honestly confront the challenges that its own rules, structures, and customs have
put in place.”).
344. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 394 (Cal. 2006) (“For better or worse, being
intentionally thrown at is a fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of baseball.”).
345. EITZEN, supra note 342, at 121 (stating that “sport, as an institution, is conservative”).
346. See Nussbaum, supra note 343 (“Even before the sweeping rule changes [to football] in 1906,
there was concern in some quarters that any changes would alter the game to the point at which it
became unrecognizable and, worse, unmasculine. The artist Frederic Remington summed up these
concerns in a letter to the legendary Walter Camp: ‘Football, in my opinion, is best at its worst. I do not
believe in all its namby-pamby talk, and I hope the game will not be emasculated and robbed of its
heroic qualities’”).
347. See Dave Zirin, The NFL Can’t Make Football Safer, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013, 2:34 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-football-be-fundamentally-changed-to-make-it-safer/thenfl-cant-make-football-safer. Similarly, youth football programs have resisted making any changes to
the game itself, despite medical evidence that hits to younger players pose increased dangers of
concussions. See Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Questions About Heads up Tackling, ESPN
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10276129/popular-nfl-backed-heads-tacklingmethod-questioned-former-players. Instead, administrators (and the NFL) have implemented rule
changes that simply limit the number of hits in practice. Anahad O’Connor, Trying to Reduce Head
Injuries, Youth Football Limits Practices, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
06/14/sports/pop-warner-football-limits-contact-in-ractices.html?_r=0 (quoting Jon Butler of Pop
Warner Football, stating that rule changes regarding hits in practice could not go farther because young
athletes needed to be prepared to take hits in games); Jon Solomon, USA Football Wants to Change
Youth Football. Does Heads up Football Work?, ALA. (Feb. 20, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.al.com/
sports/index.ssf/2014/02/usa_football_wants_to_change_y.html (stating that there would be no changes
to the game of youth football, but instead “education” about proper tackling technique as a means of
keeping football “viable” in the future).
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improve coaching.348 Similarly, in response to a concussion lawsuit, the Illinois
High School Association, which regulates high school sports in the state,
asserted that “simply put, high school football should not be subject to being
dismantled or reassembled.”349
Finally, Dr. Robert Cantu has called for “fine-tuning” of many sports to
limit concussions in children.350 Cantu noted, however, the strong resistance by
parents and coaches to change the rules because “[they] are satisfied with the
rules as they are.”351 Indeed, one of the critiques of the legal response to
concussions goes to the heart of this entrenched thinking; state statutes
emphasize management of a player once a concussion has occurred, taking the
initial concussion as a given part of sports.352
But the legal and policy response to concussions in sports serves to remind
us that, of course, sports are at their core made-up games.353 They are social
constructs injected with values that are reflected in society at large. Justice
Scalia powerfully made this point in his dissent in PGA Tour v. Martin,354 a
case involving a challenge to the PGA Tour’s refusal to permit golfer Casey
Martin use of a cart during play to accommodate his disability.355 The Court
held that the PGA Tour was required to accommodate Martin and allow him to
use a cart because walking was not “fundamental” to the game.356 Justice
Scalia stated that the rules of a particular sport are “entirely arbitrary,” so “it is
quite impossible to say that any of a game’s arbitrary rules is ‘essential.’ . . .

348. Jordan Carleo-Evangelist, Bill Asks Ban on Youth Tackle, TIMESUNION (Nov. 15, 2013, 12:10
PM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Bill-asks-ban-on-youth-tackle-4983088.php. But note
that at least one state has made a change. Sarah Ferris, California Tackles Full-Contact Football in
Schools, WASH. POST (July 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/23/
california-tackles-full-contact-football-in-schools/. California recently passed legislation limiting fullcontact football practices in school sports programs. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35179.5 (West 2015).
349. IHSA Responds to Concussion Lawsuit, supra note 109.
350. Robert C. Cantu, Preventing Sports Concussions Among Children, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/sports/concussion-prevention-for-child-athletes-robert-ccantu.html.
351. Id.
352. See Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 397 (Cal. 2006); Bradley Partridge,
Repeated Head Injuries Highlight Gaps in Sports Concussion Management, THE CONVERSATION (June
25, 2014, 6:27 AM), https://theconversation.com/repeated-head-injuries-highlight-gaps-in-sportsconcussion-management-28395.
353. EITZEN, supra note 342, at 244 (stating that “[s]port is a social construction” created by people,
and it can be changed by people as well).
354. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 699–702 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 664–70 (majority opinion).
356. Id. at 663, 690.
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The only support for any of them is tradition and . . . insistence by . . . the
ruling body of the sport . . . .”357 Indeed, sports scholars have stated that sport
is governed by a “wholly arbitrary, entirely contingent, and—to anyone
unfamiliar with any given sport—frankly bizarre-seeming set of rules and
regulations that themselves enable a sport to achieve its true goal:
entertainment.”358 Sport, then, is not pre-determined or unchangeable but, on
the contrary, is “created by people interacting, using their skills and interests to
make sport into something that meets their interests and needs.”359 It is perhaps
the realization, whether conscious or not, that our sports entertainment is at the
expense of athletes’ health and well being that is driving the norm change
around sports participation and head injuries.
In addition to eroding the view that there are essential, “inherent” features
of sports, the legal response to concussions presents a high-profile challenge to
the view that the government generally should not be involved in sports—or at
least in how the games are played.360 An important justification for the “hands
off” approach government takes with sports is that the government should defer
to those private regulators, such as the NCAA, USOC, or professional leagues,
that are in the best position to preserve and administer the games that entertain
us.361 Thus, courts and legislatures are not thought to be in the best position to
mediate the social construct that is sports.362 The legal and policy response to
concussions, however, has made clear that too much deference to sports

357. Id. at 700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
358. Dan O’Connor & Ishan Dasgupta, Sport Is Arbitrary, and That’s OK, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 30,
30 (2012).
359. Frey & Eitzen, supra note 16, at 503, 505.
360. See PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the PGA Tour need only
provide access to the game but does not have to change its rules to comply with the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
361. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85, 88
(1984) (explaining how the NCAA has assumed the task of governing how games are played and who is
eligible to play them); Josephine R. Potuto, NCAA as State Actor Controversy: Much Ado About
Nothing, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2012) (discussing how “[t]he arguments for and against
state actor status for the NCAA's regulation of intercollegiate athletics focus less on a black letter rule
enunciation of what should make a private actor subject to constitutional mandates and more on a seatof-the-pants perception of circumstances, equities, and consequences”); see also Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638–40 (9th Cir. 1993) (“NCAA legislation consists of both
substantive rules and a procedural enforcement program.”). But see Vikram David Amar, The NCAA as
Regulator, Litigant, and State Actor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 415, 415 (2011).
362. See Potuto, supra note 361, at 39–44. Indeed, the Court has applauded the private regulator for
its involvement in the construction and regulation of how each sport is played, showing broad deference
to private entities in areas where the Court may consider itself a part of the audience rather than the
referee. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
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regulators can exact too high a cost on athletes. Notwithstanding the NFL’s
agenda in lobbying for concussion statutes, the legal and policy response to
concussions has included a high-profile framing of an issue in sports that
government is in the best position to solve. As a result, a new understanding
can emerge that government involvement in sports is not always an
unwarranted intrusion but can be beneficial. Such an understanding will chip
away at the “hands off” approach that shapes our public discourse around
sports regulation.
IV. TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING SPORTS
These two outcomes—eroding the calcified thinking that aspects of sport
are essential and challenging the notion that the government has little role to
play in sports—can create much-needed policy space for reconsidering the role
of law in sports. To that end, a new framework for thinking about government
regulation of sports could replace the “hands off” view that currently prevails
with a more nuanced approach that conceptualizes the appropriateness, or not,
of government regulation based on the context in which the sport is played, the
values at stake in that context, and the government’s ability to enhance the
public good through sports.
To begin, it is important to note that rethinking the role for the government
in sports does not lead to the conclusion that more regulation and litigation over
sports is better or should be pursued in all cases.363 Indeed, the “hands off”
approach to sports regulation has substantial benefits.364
Government
involvement in sport at its extreme brings to mind Soviet-era sportive
nationalism, where Eastern Bloc governments invested heavily in sports as a
means of cultivating international influence and prestige.365 Moreover,
voluntary associations and governing bodies for sports in general do a fine job
prescribing rules for competition, hosting sporting events, and enforcing rules
of eligibility and play.366 Rethinking a role for the government in sports,
therefore, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a new executive

363. See Lawrence M. Vance, Strong Helmets and the Stronger Hand of the Government, FUTURE
FREEDOM FOUND. (May 31, 2011), http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/strong-helmets-stronger-handgovernment/.
364. See Kelley & Carchia, supra note 30 (quoting a study revealing that $5 billion was spent on
childhood sports in 2009); supra notes 46–66 and accompanying text.
365. VINOKUR, supra note 32, at 15.
366. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88–89.
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branch agency or government sports “ministry” must be created.367 Instead, in
rethinking the role of government in sports, it is important to consider ways in
which law and the democratic process can be used to inject important values
into sports programs that already enjoy substantial public funding and legal
support.
Additionally, rethinking the role of government in sports goes beyond the
issues with sports programs today. It is important because of the range of uses
for sports in contributing to lifetime health and wellness.368 That is, we must
consider a new way of thinking about sports—not just for those who have the
“privilege” to participate but also for all of those who do not and what that
means for society. Creating policy space to reconsider the government’s
attitude toward involvement in sports is, therefore, important not just to ensure
fairness to football players or athletes in “revenue generating” college sports. It
is important so that, for instance, we can have another weapon in the fight
against childhood obesity and so that all children—and not just the talented
few—can enjoy the positive benefits that social science research amply
demonstrates come with sports participation.369
The legal and policy response to concussions in sports points out the
uneasy, and often harmful, fit of the government’s “hands off” approach as
applied across multiple sports contexts.370 A lesson from the government’s
response to concussions in sports is that law can be used to better account for
the differences in sports contexts by calibrating a balance of important values
that are not currently served by a one-size-fits-all approach. Accordingly,
367. See Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573, 577
(2015). Though some commentators have persuasively made the case that a government agency is
necessary in the professional sports context. Id.
368. Brustad et al., supra note 23, at 352 (stating that “there is good general support for the notion that
participation in structured youth sport has beneficial effects on the physical activity behaviors, lifestyle
practices, and psychological well being of youngsters”); Designing, supra note 39 (explaining the health
benefits of sports participation and the childhood obesity epidemic).
369. FARREY, supra note 54, at 64–65; Brustad et al., supra note 23, at 352; Koller, supra note 185, at
413. Indeed, such benefits have been recognized for decades as being an important national priority.
See S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 12 (1978) (“[T]he development of a successful amateur sports program in the
United States is tantamount to the availability of Federal financial assistance at an early date. It must be
recognized that broad-scale amateur sports opportunities for a maximum number of individuals at all
ages and all levels of ability not only serve as a deterrent to many of our current social problems, but
also make a substantial contribution to the development of the individual and to our society.”).
370. Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 93 (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair, President’s
Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (“Some argue that the government should have no role in sports.
I beg to differ. In fact, I’d venture to say that our government has created our upside down priorities
that are skewed to elite athletes. For example, Congress has given Major League Baseball an exemption
from anti-trust laws . . . [b]ut no one is a watch-dog for our kids.”).
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rather than reflexively rejecting most forms of government involvement in
sports, government regulation of sports should be conceptualized as a
contextual continuum with varying levels of regulation depending on whether a
given issue is a matter of youth sports, school sports, or sports at the Olympic
or professional level. Such a continuum would place professional sports in the
position of enjoying the most deference because they function like other private
businesses. Youth sports occurring in schools would enjoy the least deference.
The result would be more law and democratic input into how publicly
supported sports programs are constructed and administered to promote the
public good.
The values underlying professional sports participation are consistent with
the mission of the professional sports context: an emphasis on winning,
commercial appeal, and discrimination in favor of the most talented athletes.
These values support the commercial interests of the professional sports
enterprise, and a professional sports team is not likely to be successful without
emphasizing them. Because professional sports are businesses, they should be
treated like other free-market enterprises. Moreover, to the extent special
circumstances make sports an imperfect fit for some legal doctrines, courts
have made common-sense adjustments, such as in the antitrust context where
some cooperation among members of a league is viewed as necessary to
generating the “product” of competitive sports.371 In addition, concerns over
player safety are best addressed through the robust unionization of professional
leagues372 and existing legal remedies for employees, such as workers’
compensation laws.373 However, due to the fact that government action gave
professional sports leagues powerful monopoly power that can injure
consumers, some have argued that more regulation is needed in discrete areas
such as stadium financing and franchise relocation.374 Otherwise, because of
their business nature and the legal protections available to athletes, there is no
urgency to rethinking the government’s regulatory approach toward
371. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202–03 (2010).
372. NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nbpa.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2016); NFL
PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflpa.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2016); MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS
UNION,
http://www.mlsplayers.org
(last
visited
Jan.
13,
2016);
MLB
PLAYERS,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2016); WOMEN’S NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://wnbpa.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
373. Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Squeeze Play: Workers’ Compensation and
the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 95, 95–96 (1995); J. Brad Reich, When
“Getting Your Bell Rung” May Lead to “Ringing the Bell”: Potential Compensation for NFL Player
Concussion-Related Injuries, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 198, 228 (2013).
374. See Grow, supra note 367, at 646–47. See generally ROSENTRAUB, supra note 26.
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professional sports leagues.375
However, such justifications are not as readily translated to other sports
settings. Indeed, as the context shifts from professional to Olympic,
intercollegiate, interscholastic, and youth recreational sports, the deference to
private sports regulators and commercial values are harder to justify. This can
lead to tensions between the “professionalization” of sports outside of the
professional context and a neglect of other important values that are at stake.376
For this reason, the deferential, “hands off” approach taken toward professional
sports should not be reflexively applied in other sports settings, and the legal
response to concussions suggests how.377
Outside of the realm of professional sports, although sometimes
overlapping, are Olympic and intercollegiate sports.378 Both of these contexts
present circumstances best served by a middle ground approach to government
regulation, where government regulation can and should be more nuanced than
the general “hands off” philosophy applied to the private sector sports industry.
In the Olympic and intercollegiate context, the “hands off” approach to
regulation is most justified for matters such as determining athlete eligibility (in
terms of compliance with sporting rules) and the actual rules of the game.379
The structure of such programs, however, can and should be open to greater
public input.380

375. At least one scholar has remarked that because of “the huge role that professional sports play in
American life,” Congress keeps a “watchful eye” on professional sports. LOWE, supra note 33, at 132–
33.
376. See Nw. Univ. v. NLRB, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 1 (2015) (discussing whether collegiate
athletes should be considered employees but failing to reach a conclusion); Ben Strauss, In a First,
Northwestern Players Seek Unionization, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/
29/sports/ncaafootball/northwestern-players-take-steps-to-form-a-union.html?_r=0.
377. See Andrew B. Carrabis, Head Hunters: The Rise of Neurological Concussions in American
Football and Its Legal Implications, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 371, 385–86 (2011); see also supra
Part II.A.
378. Note that there is overlap between these contexts, in that the same athlete may participate as both
an intercollegiate or professional athlete and an Olympic athlete. See, e.g., Sandy Thatcher, NCAA
Athletes in Olympic Sports Should Be Able to Keep Earnings; Rules Need Changing, SWIMMING
WORLD,
http://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/ncaa-athletes-olympic-sports-able-keepearnings-rules-need-changing/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
379. See Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, Regulate, Don’t Litigate, Change in College Sports,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 10, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/06/10/college-sportswould-be-better-reformed-through-federal-regulation-lawsuits-essay. See generally Chris J. Carlsen &
Matthew Shane Walker, The Sports Court: A Private System to Deter Violence in Professional Sports,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 421 (1982).
380. See Dionne L. Koller, The Obese and the Elite: Using Law to Reclaim School Sports, 67 OKLA.
L. REV. 383, 436–37 (2015).
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With respect to the Olympic Movement, a more nuanced approach is
necessary because developing and supporting Olympic talent involves a
pyramid structure381 of sports with the widest base being grassroots
participation opportunities to bring a large number of children into sports.382
From there, and over time, Olympic talent will emerge and be nurtured at the
highest peak through elite sports training.383 At the elite level, rules of
competition and eligibility are derived from international sporting
organizations, and domestic courts and legislatures rightly stay out of such
matters.384 Moreover, discrimination among athletes at the elite level on the
basis of talent is central to the mission of the Olympic Games.385 For these
athletes, the Olympic Movement’s ability to provide them a voice in
governance and provide due process in resolving disputes, without government
intervention, is well documented.386 Through the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, athletes and sports governing bodies have access to specialized
arbitration procedures and a private legal regime that has created “a uniform
body of lex sportiva that is predictable and evenly applied worldwide.”387 As
such, the hands off, deferential approach is more warranted at the level of
supporting and selecting elite talent for international competition, and the
Amateur Sports Act and court decisions reflecting this approach are well
justified.
However, an effective Olympic program relies on grassroots sports
opportunities to help develop those who will become the nation’s elite

381. PAUL DOWNWARD ET AL., SPORTS ECONOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY 53 (2009)
(“There are distinctions in the US, where professional sports and amateur sports have developed more
independently, but they are, of course, still inextricably linked . . . [because they both] feed talent
vertically into professional sports” and the Olympic Games, “the largest sporting event.”).
382. Koller, supra note 380; see, e.g., Michael Carvell, How Early Is Too Early for Colleges to
Recruit Kids for Football, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 30, 2015), http://recruiting.blog.ajc.com/2015/03/
30/how-early-is-too-early-for-colleges-to-recruit-kids-for-football/.
383. Indeed, this grassroots to elite model was initially envisioned as being the mission of the United
States Olympic Committee. FARREY, supra note 54, at 184–85. The original Amateur Sports Act stated
that the USOC’s purpose was to establish national goals for, and encourage participation in, amateur
athletics. 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (2012).
384. See Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, No. 3:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT, 2008 WL 2567657, at *1
(N.D. Fla. June 24, 2008) (finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over athlete’s challenge under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of anti-doping rule enforcement pursuant to World Anti-Doping
Code and Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions).
385. Mitten & Opie, supra note 19, at 319–21.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 269, 306.
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athletes.388 Indeed, as initially conceived, the American Olympic Movement
and the USOC were intended to develop grassroots opportunities and support
broad-based recreational athletics for the general population.389 However, as
currently operated, the USOC focuses almost exclusively on using its resources
to develop athletes with the best chance of winning Olympic medals.390 The
government has deferred to the USOC, and its sponsors, to determine that the
USOC’s focus will be on medal winning and its commercial rewards.391 The
USOC, therefore, does not primarily allocate its resources at the base of the
American Olympic pyramid, but it aims the bulk of its funding to the athletes at
the peak. It is over this policy choice that the federal government, which
created the modern USOC and gave it the exclusive right to market the
Olympic trademarks, has a role to play. For instance, Congress could require
the USOC to invest more in community sports programs as a condition of
retaining the exclusive use of the Olympic trademark and tax-exempt status.392
Congress could set targets for underserved populations, such as children in
urban environments and lower socio-economic status who are less likely to be
involved in sports. Congress could also grant the USOC funding to develop a
388. S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 12–13 (1978) (stating that an adequately funded grassroots amateur sports
program is critical to the United States’ Olympic success).
389. FARREY, supra note 54, at 184 (citing to statements of Senators Ted Stevens and Richard Stone
who intended that the USOC, through the Amateur Sports Act, would foster greater grassroots athletics
opportunities); see Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Sen. Ted Stevens, Member, S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.) (noting that a purpose of the hearing was to determine whether
the USOC was meeting their responsibility under the Amateur Sports Act to promote grassroots amateur
athletic opportunities).
390. FARREY, supra note 54, at 188–90. The USOC’s mission is to “support U.S. Olympic and
Paralympic athletes in achieving sustained competitive excellence while demonstrating the values of the
Olympic Movement, thereby inspiring all Americans” and to “provid[e] financial support and jointly
work[] to develop customized, creative and impactful athlete-support and coaching education
programs.” About the USOC, TEAM USA, http://www.teamusa.org/about-the-usoc (last visited Dec. 16,
2015); see Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 76 (statement of Ed Burke, Chair, Community Based
Multisport Organizations/Armed Forces Council of the USOC and Junior Olympic Committee of the
USOC) (stating that the USOC’s budget and spending had shifted away from grassroots opportunities
and development programs “in favor of sport for the elite athletes who best have the chance” to
represent the United States in the Olympic Games”).
391. FARREY, supra note 54, at 188–89 (“[T]he broadcast and corporate partners were telling the
USOC leadership that they, like the The Boss, wanted winners now.”).
392. Such proposals have been made in the past. Amateur Sports Act, supra note 4, at 89 (statement
of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair, President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (stating that
Congress should consider requiring the USOC to earmark revenues from the licensing of the Olympic
trademarks to expand grass roots sports opportunities); see id. at 104 (statement of Jeff Darman,
Governmental Legislative Affairs Liaison, Road Runners Club of America) (urging Congress to support
additional funding for grassroots sports programs through the USOC and the resources generated
through the licensing of the Olympic trademarks).
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more comprehensive grassroots youth sports system to increase recreational
opportunities. Or Congress could move past the concept of the USOC having
primary responsibility for amateur sports in the United States and simply
acknowledge the USOC as the body responsible for elite, Olympic athletics.
Congress could then create a second organization, with suitable funding, to
develop and promote youth grassroots athletics.393 Thus, while the hands off
approach to sports is justified at the elite levels, where the United States’
Olympic program has to play by international rules when entering its elite
athletes in international competition, the way in which the United States
provides opportunities for children and youth to participate in sports is an
increasingly important domestic issue.394 Such an issue, in the shadow of a
childhood obesity epidemic, does not warrant a “hands off” approach, and it
need not be left to the discretion of the private USOC and the market forces that
necessarily shape its mission.
Intercollegiate sports present a similar gray area in which some deference
to sports regulators and the private NCAA and athletic conferences is
appropriate. However, the intersection of intercollegiate sports programs with
educational institutions that enjoy tax-exempt status and federal financial
support395 warrant a greater role for the government. To meaningfully navigate
this gray area, thought must be given to the way in which intercollegiate sports
programs are structured. The dominant model currently employed by colleges
and universities values winning and commercial success and, by extension,
emphasizes elite athletic talent.396 This model flourishes in intercollegiate
athletics because of the enormous deference given to the NCAA and
educational institutions to structure their programs with little government
interference.
Commercial values, more so than educational values,
predominate.397
Eroding the thinking that any aspect of sports is essential or that any sports
393. See id. at 105 (statement of Jeff Darman, Governmental Legislative Affairs Liaison, Road
Runners Club of America) (stating that the government should “try dramatic new approaches” to
stimulating grassroots sports participation); see also id. at 89 (statement of Thomas McMillen, Co-Chair,
President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports) (stating that countries such as Great Britain and
Germany have sports ministries which focus on sports participation opportunities for all citizens).
394. See, e.g., Youth Physical Activity: The Role of Schools, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION (Aug. 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/physicalactivity/toolkit/factsheet_pa_
guidelines_schools.pdf.
395. See National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act, H.R. 2731, 114th Cong. (2015).
396. JOHN V. LOMBARDI ET AL., THE LOMBARDI PROGRAM ON MEASURING UNIVERSITY
PERFORMANCE, THE SPORTS IMPERATIVE IN AMERICA’S RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 9 (2003).
397. Id.
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model is a natural, “inherent” feature of athletics creates space to consider ways
in which the so-called “collegiate model” may be restructured to better serve
students. Federal law, therefore, can play a role in setting baseline
requirements, beyond gender equity, for all college and university athletic
programs that receive federal financial assistance.398 Some scholars have
suggested that Congress should create a regulatory agency to manage college
athletics.399 Additionally, state legislatures can consider setting more particular
sports agendas for their institutions. For instance, rather than leave an
institution’s selection of sports and levels of competitions to athletic directors,
state legislatures could set guidelines on what sports an institution emphasizes,
or not, and how many students would be served. Moreover, state legislatures
could set specific requirements on how much of a university’s funds (and
student fees) may be allocated to the athletic department budget.400
Therefore, in both the Olympic and intercollegiate contexts, beyond the
details of how the games are played and who is eligible are larger policy
questions related to the use of sports programs in the national interest and in the
educational setting that legislatures are suited to answer.401 In this regard, the
case for deference to sports regulators is weaker, and the government has a
legitimate claim to regulation because of the context.
Finally, on the furthest end of the continuum from professional sports are
youth sports. Youth sports participation opportunities are provided primarily
through the private sector and (mostly secondary) schools.402 Certainly, private
sector youth sports programs justifiably enjoy some freedom from government
regulation.403 Parents can serve to protect their child’s interests and make

398. Although the need for reform of intercollegiate athletics is much-discussed, some authors have
suggested that “political considerations” and “substantial vested interests of policymakers and sports
fans” get in the way, as does the “entrenched symbiotic relationship between the professional leagues”
and colleges and universities. William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong & Eric Weitz, Full Court Press:
Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 65 (2014).
399. Matthew Mitten & Stephen Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational
Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 869 (2014).
400. See, e.g., Alex Moyer, Note, Throwing out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s Anticompetitive
Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 822 (2015) (providing proof
that legislators can regulate university budgetary requirements: “One piece of legislation, which passed
seventy-nine-to-one, was a proposal that ‘redefines an athletic scholarship so that it can cover not only
the traditional tuition, room, board, books and fees, but also the incidental costs of attending college’”).
401. See Koller, supra note 380, at 411–12, 414–15. See generally Moyer, supra note 400, at 823
(arguing that “Congress [is] the last, and best, hope to replace the amateurism regime”).
402. See Koller, supra note 185, at 449; see also Improving Sports Safety, supra note 5.
403. See Davis, supra note 18, at 234 (“Traditionally, private law was viewed as providing the
principal legal mechanism for regulating the sports industries.”); Harvey et al., supra note 11, at 87.

737

[Vol. 43: 681, 2016]

Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

informed choices about programs that best suit their child’s needs and the
family’s budget. However, the legal response to concussions points to an area
where government can productively regulate private sector youth sports to
promote health and safety. While parents may often be in the best position to
manage their child’s development as an athlete, much has been written about
the tendency of many parents to encourage children’s unhealthy engagement
with sports and the incidence of overuse injuries and harms of overtraining.404
Moreover, although the legal and policy response to concussions has not been
grounded on narratives of overzealous parents, an important feature of the
response is educating parents and changing norms within families that playing
through injury is not safe or appropriate for children.405 Thus, future regulation
of private sector youth sports can focus on similar areas of children’s health and
well being.
This is not to say, however, that all youth sports programming406 should be
left to the private sector. Scholars have explained that the values, goals, and
types of participation opportunities structuring youth sports programs are
determined by adults, and such programs tend to have “a strong orientation
toward competitive outcomes and the exclusion of those who are less
talented.”407 Private sector youth sports programs therefore manifest “an
orientation toward competitive results rather than physical activity promotion
or personal growth.”408 Given the focus of private youth sports programs (and
the fact that the USOC has largely abandoned any effort at providing grassroots
youth sports opportunities with tacit approval from Congress), there is a
compelling argument in favor of the federal and state governments directing
more regulatory attention toward youth sports by mandating and funding broadbased youth sports programs that can fill the gap left by the private sector.
Thus, Congress and state governments could go a long way toward closing
the gaps left by the private sector youth sports system by rethinking the
404. See James R. Andrews, Why Are There So Many Injuries to Our Young Athletes?
Professionalization and Specialization in Youth Sport, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 575, 576 (2011). See
generally MARK HYMAN, UNTIL IT HURTS: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH YOUTH SPORTS AND HOW IT
HARMS OUR KIDS (2010).
405. See Lowrey & Morain, supra note 213, at 290, 294.
406. Scholars have explained that most youth sports opportunities in the United States are through
“organized youth sport involvement” instead of “self-organized physical play” and that organized youth
sports are “adult-structured competitive sport opportunities” with adults “determining the philosophy,
goals, and structure of the sport experience” as well as other decisions such as “who will have access to
participation and who will be excluded.” Brustad et al., supra note 23, at 351–53.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 353.
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deference given to school sports programs. In stark contrast to professional and
elite Olympic sports, youth sports in schools should receive the least insulation
from government involvement. Education-based sports programs are touted as
an extension of the educational process and, therefore, should not be grounded
in the same commercial, elite sport norms and values. As such, government
should consider ways in which such programs could be used in the public
interest. For instance, social science research clearly demonstrates that sports
are beneficial to children’s health and well being and that family income is the
most significant factor in predicting whether children will participate.409 Thus,
one of the most important means of increasing sports opportunities is through
fully funded programs in schools in which all children participate.410 Federal
and state government could achieve full participation by requiring schools to
provide an intramural, instead of varsity, sports program.
Similarly, government could use schools as laboratories to experiment with
new sports options.411 The legal and policy response to concussions in sports is
successfully challenging the thinking that playing traditional sports, in
traditional ways, is the only legitimate sports experience. By requiring a fuller
range of sports options or incentivizing experimentation with new sports,412
both the federal and state governments can be leaders in increasing sports
participation and creating sports opportunities that provide less risk of harm to
participants and appeal to a variety of athletic abilities.413 Thus, government
can use sports in schools as a way to expand the definition of sport and reshape
the view of who is an athlete, so that the benefits of sports participation can be
more widely shared.

409. Designing, supra note 39.
410. Id. This is especially critical because our nation’s youth sports structure “is configured in a
manner designed to identify and promote the next generation of athlete-entertainers,” and “talented
children” are the focus of our youth sports culture. FARREY, supra note 54, at 74.
411. Schools have been, and are still used, as laboratories to test a number of new ideas. Thus, testing
new sports options is just one more experiment that could be performed in schools. Cf. Wendy Parker,
Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691,
1753 (2004) (observing that schools were used to test different approaches to desegregation); Amy P.
Meek, Note, School Discipline “As Part of the Teaching Process”: Alternative and Compensatory
Education Required by the State’s Interest in Keeping Children in School, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
155, 160–61 (2009) (noting that schools experimented with different disciplinary actions to improve
student behavior, academic outcomes, and school safety).
412. Designing, supra note 39, at 3 (explaining that new sport options are needed to reach a wider
population of children).
413. See id. at 7 (“It’s not just about providing access to existing experiences. It’s about
understanding what are the new experiences we need to create. It’s about broadening the definition and
offering more things.”).
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Rather than seeking to regulate current sport offerings as constructed by
sports regulators, governments can seek to use sports in the public interest to
provide greater health and wellness benefits that translate across gender and
socio-economic lines and include students with intellectual and physical
disabilities.414 Indeed, Senator McCain’s comments stated that one of the few
legitimate bases for government intervention in sports—fighting performanceenhancing drug use—was justified as necessary to protect children’s health.415
While doping in sports may potentially affect thousands of children,416
childhood obesity profoundly affects the health of millions.417
The legal and policy response to concussions has helped erode the norms
that have served to insulate sports and entrench our understandings that certain
features of sports are inherent and not subject to change. In so doing,
government involvement in sports is being legitimized in ways it has not been
before. This legitimacy creates policy space to consider ways the government
can play a role in enhancing sports experiences and expanding sports
opportunities in the future.418 The federal and state governments, therefore,
should contemplate legal changes that do not simply support our current model
for sports or mitigate the effects of sports as designed and administered by
others. Instead, future sports law initiatives should be developed by
considering ways that the government and the democratic process can be used
to provide greater and more meaningful sports participation opportunities to a
wider population of children.

414. Id. at 1 (stating that just three out of every ten kids plays sports on a regular basis and “the shut
out and pushed out, as well as those who opt out, are the norm, denied an experience that has the
potential to deliver an array of social, health and other benefits”; “barriers to [sports] participation are
greatest among vulnerable populations, children whose family or personal circumstances—economic,
physical or otherwise—limit their access to the youth sport system as currently structured”).
415. See The Dan Patrick Show, supra note 1.
416. Jacqueline Stenson, Kids on Steroids Willing to Risk It All for Success, NBC NEWS (Mar. 3,
2008, 10:31 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22984780/ns/health-childrens_health/t/kids-steroidswilling-risk-it-all-success/#.VO-FYPnF-n8.
417. Nearly 18% of children aged six to eleven and nearly 21% of children aged twelve to nineteen
are classified as obese, and as of 2012, the CDC states that more than one-third of children and
adolescents are overweight or obese. Childhood Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
418. See Bradley Fawver & J.O. Spengler, Funding for Youth Sport: Learning from the Past and
Aligning Resources for the Future, ASPEN INST. (Mar. 2014), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/
default/files/content/docs/UF_SPARC_Funding_Youth_Sport_Research_Brief.pdf.
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V. CONCLUSION
Law traditionally has been used in service of the goals of private actors in
sports. The legal and policy response to concussions can be viewed as a narrow
legal reform that is, at best, aspirational and, at worst, using law to shore up the
game of football and protect the NFL’s long-term business interests. However,
while some aspects of the legal and policy response to concussions may be
dismissed as an industry-driven reform, it nevertheless is stimulating important
normative changes that can provide a useful pathway for future government
regulation of sports. First, the legal and policy response to concussions is
causing Americans to rethink the traditional deference given to sports
administrators and regulators, particularly with respect to youth and amateur
sports. It also challenges the thinking that traditional aspects of sport are
essential, inherent features of games. In this way, the legal and policy response
to concussions can create important policy space to consider the ways in which
sport can be used in the future to serve important public goals and reflect a
wider range of public values.
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